University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects

Supervised Undergraduate Student Research
and Creative Work

Spring 5-2001

Competitive Intelligence: Is My company at Risk?
William Andrew Staszewski
University of Tennessee-Knoxville

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj

Recommended Citation
Staszewski, William Andrew, "Competitive Intelligence: Is My company at Risk?" (2001). Chancellor’s
Honors Program Projects.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj/495

This is brought to you for free and open access by the Supervised Undergraduate Student Research and Creative
Work at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chancellor’s
Honors Program Projects by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange.
For more information, please contact trace@utk.edu.

AppendixD-

UNIVERSITY HONORS PROGRAM
SENIOR PROJECT - APPROVAL

Name:

__ ~~~~~ ___~\~~~~~j ________________________________ _

College:

~~~___~iJi~\:r...2~L

Fa cui ty

Men to r:

PR 0 JE C T

TITLE:

Department:

_-.Atto./..=i"j-___________ _

__ ~.t. . . ___~ \. ___~Q.~ ____________________________ _

____ .::!..L\~~rJ~

\'--Q. ___~('~~t!_~~o~___ r-(Q.~~-\;\.~~-------

-----~~~~~~~---~--~j--l\~---~~~~-~~--t~~1-lr---------I have reviewed this completed senior honors thesis with this student and certify
that it is a project commensurate with honors level undergraduate research in this
field.
Signed:
Date:

---I~-p-OO------------------,

-~--~"f'.20-Q.L--

Comments (Optional):

27

Faculty

Mentor

AppendixC..

·

'

,

lJNIVERSITY HONORS PROGRAM
SENIOR PROJECT - PROSPECTUS

Name:

__\Jc \~~____ ~~~~~~L ___________________________ _

College:

_~~~_~~ ___ ~~~J~.!-__ Department:

Faculty

~entor:

P R OJE C T

__ ik~

TITLE:

_________ _

___ I\t_~~_~~

__~~s~ _____~~~__________________________ _

_____________________________________________ _

______(A~ \~~t-____~\~~r ~-~--~~--J.~--~+--~~t~~-----__________ A~ ___~~~_l _____________________________________ _
PROJECT DESCRIPTION (Attach not more than one additional page, if necessary):

~t..
9~

fA

~;t l\.t~S
o""r ~"t..
t~ ~~\o"

LJ'\\

t,<.v..~

*k

G\.~\-

Wr",(..

Gv\

0\

fro~r-9\.~

~ ..\t.

(.

\f\~\\r~~
()~~ rN..~

'\

fro~~t-\.

-\L~S

' l-~~ .

~

D..t\

(NU\l\~

o..Ur~.~
t1

tk:",(. \orl"'-l."\-

w\., l

f°')!>\~~

c:u-t.. )

1'1

,

~

I~

(,"{f () ";)'v.I""<.

t

(o~t \.t\J"t.

~

(\1>\

~\t.\\I~lft~

(,\~\.

:.;;~::e.d ..::~~~~~~~~:~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~-;~~~~~~~;~~~.
I have discussed this research proposal with this student and agree to serve in an
advisory role, as faculty mentor, and to certify the acceptability of the completed .
project.

Signed: _~~_e~
Date: _E~ __rtLi{PPJ
c~;;Pi~ted';:;'aorm

_________________, Faculty Mentor

Return this
to The University Honors Program, F10l Melrose Hall,
974-7875, not later than the end of your 3rd year in residence.

26

Information Protection
Competitive Intelligence:
Is My Company At Risk?
William Staszewski
Submitted in partial fulfillment of
University Honors 458
May 2,2001

Contents
Overview
Managing Infonnation
Information Loss
Relevant Fields of Study
Examples of Infonnation Compromise
Types of Sensitive Infonnation
Protection Programs
Economic Espionage Act
Summary

3
4
5
6
7
10
11

Audit Program

12

References
End Notes

22

Appendices
A. ASIS/PWC: Trends in Proprietary Infonnation Loss
B. CI Is and Is Not
C. SCIP: CI profession overview
D. Joint Venture Management of Infonnation
E. SCIP: EEA Analysis
F. Internet Resources

2

23

24
43

47
60
64

76

Information Protection
Since the advent of the modem "information age," it has become increasingly
important for business professionals to recognize the value of information and the need
for active protection of valuable information in organizations. This paper seeks to
develop a general audit program to help organizations evaluate whether their valuable
information is protected. While far from an exhaustive analysis of the subject, the paper
brings together a variety of .informational sources and presents the key ideas in three main
sections. These sections include a general overview of information protection, the actual
information protection audit program, and six appendices attached at the end of the paper.

Managing Information
Because information is a valuable resource, it would be ideal to manage
information in much the same way that other corporate resources are managed.} This,
however, has not been the case in recent years. Despite estimates that seventy percent or
more of the market value of a typical u.S . company resides in intellectual property assets
(IP), information protection is not a security priority of most companies. In fact,
formalized valuation and tracking procedures typically do not exist for these assets, and
since the value of IP assets is not well established, they are often not well protected
(PWCIASIS p. 4).

Inadequate protection of valuable assets is a business risk, especially if business
risk is defined as anything that threatens achievement of business objectives. On the
positive side, the majority of business risks are internal, can be easily analyzed, and can
be resp~nded to by a company.2 But in order to increase control over a business risk, a
company must first recognize that a problem exists. From the perspective of this paper,
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the problem is inadequate infonnation protection leading to infonnation loss and
compromIse.

Information Loss
In 1999, Fortune 1000 companies sustained losses of more than $45 billion from
thefts of their proprietary information (PWC/ ASIS p. 3). When the data are compared
with prior years, they show that incidents of theft are rising. A 1995 survey of 325
companies reported 32 cases of theft of intellectual infonnation per month in 1995 (losses
amounted to $5 .1 billion). This was more than three times the rate found in a similar
survey in 1992 (Fialka p. 15). Increasing occurrences of infonnation loss are partly due to
the unique characteristics of infonnation and to deficient security measures. Unlike
physical assets, like buildings or traditional inventory, infonnation can be in more than
one place. "Individuals no longer have to physically steal a product, they can simply
download infonnation or transmit it electronically to a single accomplice or to tens of
thousands of people in an instant - and they can do so with total anonymity.,,3 Sensitive
infonnation can be lost merely by allowing access to it.
See Appendix A for Trends in Proprietary Infonnation Loss prepared by the
American Society for Industrial Security and PricewaterhouseCoopers. This appendix
provides the results and summary of a 1999 survey showing the extent of proprietary
infonnation loss and the lack of appropriate infonnation security measures in
corporations. While the summary is repeatedly cited below, the full text is contained in an
appendix for a more thorough review.
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Relevant Fields of Study
While researching information protection, it is possible to encounter many
specific fields of study connecting to the general topic. Competitive Intelligence (CI) and
Intellectual Property (IP) are two such fields related to the protection of sensitive,
proprietary, or confidential information. These fields warrant short definitions.
Competitive Intelligence can be defined as "information relevant to strategy
formulation regarding the environmental context within which the firm competes"
(Miller, A. p. 97), but the Society for Competitive Intelligence Professionals thoroughly
describes CI as "a systematic and ethical program for gathering and analyzing
information about your competitors' activities and general business trends to further your
own company's goals.,,4
For further information on CI, see Appendix B and Appendix C. Appendix B
contains a list of ten things CI is and is not; this list was written by Leonard Fuld, a
pioneer in the CI field. Appendix C contains an overview of the CI profession compiled
by the Society for Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) in the form of
PowerPoint slides.
The term Intellectual Property usually refers to patents, trademarks, copyrights,

and trade secrets or know-how (Smith & Parr p. 89). Discussions of IP and intellectual
property rights (IPRs) usually involve applicable legal and judicial systems. 5 In regard to
information protection, both CI and IP resources provide various countermeasures and
defensive tactics that can be utilized in the protection of confidential information.
Other fields of study related to information protection include economic
intelligence, national security, asset protection, economic espionage, and
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counterintelligence. A list of internet links to sites covering these fields can be found in
Appendix F.

Examples of Information Compromise
The term "information compromise" refers to any incident in which valuable
information has reached unauthorized personnel. Information compromise includes any
thefts and misappropriation of proprietary information. While statistics on information
compromise were presented above in the "Information Loss" section, the following are
examples of information compromise (Dutka pp. 295-297):
•

The French intelligence placed agents inside French offices of mM and Texas
Instruments to steal trade secrets.

•

A CIA document provides case studies of France spying on U.S. military
contractors and high-tech firms. The French exposed four CIA spies attempting to
uncover French positions on world trade talks.

•

A company publicly announced the location of an off-site planning meeting
involving high-level executives. A competitor reserved an adjacent room and
installed bugging devices to record the proceedings. The competitor created
better-quality documentation of the session than the company conducting the
meeting.

•

An employee of a high-tech company, undaunted by a security system that
prevented unauthorized downloading of information, videotaped confidential
documents from the computer screen.

•

The president of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio, engaged in a power struggle
to control the company, found that his company telephone was tapped.

•

A retired Kodak employee pleaded guilty to offering to sell secret company
information. The former employee stole blueprints, cost breakdowns,
manufacturing reports, analytical studies, and drawings.

•

An engineer offered to sell his former employer confidential plans that he had
stolen from the company. The engineer was subsequently arrested by the FBI.
During the ensuing trial, the defense demonstrated that the company's employees
did not typically follow procedures to secure information. The court ruled that the
company had forfeited its claim to classify the information as a trade secret
because of its failure to protect the information.
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•

In a press release dated March 21, 2001, it was reported that a contract food
services employee at the Purchase, NY headquarters of MasterCard International
was arrested for stealing various confidential documents from the credit card
company. The defendant allegedly offered to sell sensitive and proprietary
information to Visa International and to record high-level meetings within
MasterCard if Visa paid and provided him with recording equipment. 6

Types of Sensitive Information
The categories listed below may help identify the general types of assets that
might be considered sensitive in a U.S. company. Asset information warranting
protection may include location, size or capacity, investment, age, etc. The five basic
categories include the following: 7
•

People
Government personnel
Contractors
Military personnel
Contractors
Consultants
o Specialized employees
o Suppliers or customers
Activities/Operations
o Intelligence collection/analysis
o Sensitive movement of operations/personnel/property
o Conduct of sensitive training
o Communications/networking
o RDT &E and sensitive technology
o Production of sensitive technology
o Protection of nuclear/chemical/biological materials
o Protection of weapons, explosives, and equipment
Information
o Classified
o Sensitive compartmented information
o Top Secret
o Secret
o Confidential
o System designs
o Intellectual property
o Patents
o System capabilities/vulnerabilities
o Sensitive methods
o
o
o
o
o

•

•
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Sensitive financial data
o Lists or plans
Facilities
o Industry sites
o Headquarters
o Field offices/administrative buildings
o Training facilities
o Contractor facilities
o Storage facilities
o Production facilities
o R&D laboratories
o Power plants
o Parking facilities
o Aircraft hangars
o Residences
o Computer facilities - data processing or server
Equipment/Materials
o Transportation equipment/vehicles
o Maintenance equipment
o Operational equipment
o Communications equipment
o Security equipment
o Weapons
o Automated information systems equipment
o

•

•

Protection Programs
Various models for evaluating and protecting informational assets have been
developed in response to threats of information compromise. While these general
programs sometimes use differing terminology, they are often conceptually similar.
Operations Security (OPSEC), originally designed for government use, is one of the
typical general information protection programs in security literature and has thus been
chosen for further explanation. 8 An example of specific policies and procedures is
provided in Appendix D which explains the particular management of sensitive
information in a merger or joint venture.
Specifically, the goal of Operations Security is to control information and
observable actions concerning capabilities, limitations, activities, and intentions, thus
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preventing or controlling their exploitation by an adversary or a business competitor.
Overall operational effectiveness is inevitably enhanced by denying an adversary or
competitor the opportunity to foresee a corporation's intentions, thereby providing the
opportunity to take measures to nullify any advantage another company may have. Proper
application of Operations Security measures can maximize a company's potential for
success.
Operations Security looks at behavior from adversaries' or competitors' points of
view. Information that they may need to achieve their goals (to the detriment of the target
firm) constitutes the critical information of a firm's business operations or activities.
Denying this critical information to adversaries/competitors enhances corporate security
and promotes overall effectiveness.
The Operations Security analytical process focuses on the adversarial exploitation
of open or public sources and observable actions to obtain evidence of critical
information. These sources are generally not designated proprietary information.
Consequently, such sources may be more difficult to control than those that are protected
as proprietary. Traditional security programs and procedures generally protect classified
or proprietary information. The Operations Security process is designed to identify those
indicators that contribute to the loss of critical information through sources that are not
protected, and to take action to deny or control the availability of those indicators to an
adversary/competitor.
Operations Security measures complement physical, information, signals,
computer, communications, electronic, and other security measures to ensure a totally
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integrated security package. Reviewing the Operations Security process often discloses
weaknesses in the application of traditional security practices.
OPSEC furnishes an analytical framework to determine:
1. Profiles of selected competitors or adversaries
2. Information or intelligence that is of greatest value to the competition
3. The likely targets of intelligence or corporate espionage directed against
the company
4. The possible and probably mechanisms that can be utilized to collect
intelligence against the company
5. The company's vulnerabilities and safeguard mechanisms that can be
instituted to limit or minimize these vulnerabilities
The steps of the OPSEC process are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Identification of critical information
Threat analysis
Vulnerability analysis
Risk assessment
Applications of appropriate countermeasures, each equally important
a. Elimination of indicators subject to exploitation
b. Disruption of effective adversary collection or processing efforts
c. Prevention of the accurate interpretation of indicators during their
analysis

George Jelen, a former director of Operations Security at the National Security
Agency (NSA) states:
Each of these phases is important to the integrity and efficacy of the overall
process. Although each of them has value in and of itself, it is only when all five
are employed together that the full synergistic value of the Operations Security
process accrues. Identification of critical information provides focus; threat
analysis assures realism; vulnerability analysis lends objectivity; risk assessment
guarantees rationality; and the application of countermeasures ensures utility and
value. Together they represent a logical and balanced approach to contending with
risk. The approach which is applicable to any competitive or adversarial situation
seeks not so much to avoid risk, as this is impossible, but rather to manage it.
(Miller, J. pp. 221-224)
By using the Operations Security analytical process, Competitive Intelligence
professionals will gain a better understanding of what information may be available to an
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adversary or competitor, the impact of information loss, and a better appreciation of ways
for its protection. The careful selection of Operations Security measures and their
appropriate application contributes to overall corporate effectiveness by protecting
critical information against compromise.
Economic Espionage Act
A worthy subject to mention in relation to information protection is the Economic
Espionage Act (EEA). Many executives mistakenly believe that the EEA automatically
protects their company's valuable information and eliminates the risk of competitive
intelligence. A brief explanation of the EEA follows; see Appendix E for a Society of
Competitive Intelligence Professionals analysis of the EEA and its influence on the CI
profession.
The Economic Espionage Act (EEA) of October 1996 made the theft of trade
secrets a federal crime. Specifically, the EEA makes it illegal to steal or "appropriate"
rivals' proprietary information without their authorization. Violators could get up to 15
years in imprisonment and fines up to $10 million (Shaker & Gembicki pp. 217-220).
A trade secret, as defined by the EEA, encompasses all types of financial,
business, scientific, technical, economic, and engineering information. These can take the
form of patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes,
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs or codes.
There are two stipulations governing the enforcement of EEA:
1. The owner must have taken "reasonable measures" to keep the
information secret, and
2. The information's value must be derived from not being readily
ascertainable through proper means, which is to say it is being kept secret.
These stipulations are somewhat broad and their interpretation is debatable.
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Review of court cases in which the EEA was applied may be necessary prior to
the initiation of litigation or other legal proceedings. The following cases involve
application of and rulings based on the EEA:
•
•
•
•

Midgard Corp. v. Todd, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3874 (loth Cir. March 5, 1997)
Merkle v. Johnson & Johnson, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5216 (D. N.J. April 15,
1997)
Blimpie International, Inc. V. Menyforetagen, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3950
(March 21, 1997)
Baystate Technologies v. Bentley Systems, Inc., F. Supp. 1079 (D. Mass. 1996)

Summary
This concludes the brief overview of information protection and the first section
of the paper. As stated above, more information regarding information protection can be
obtained through the online resources listed in Appendix F. The following section of the
paper contains the information protection audit program. The audit program was
developed in response to the increasing risks of sensitive information security
compromise. Specifically, the program helps auditors evaluate whether proper
organizational policies and procedures are in place to protect sensitive information.
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INFORMATION CONTROL AUDIT GUIDE
Last Update: April 27, 2001
Location:
Auditee(s) interviewed:

INTRODUCTION
Generic audit program to evaluate information security within a client company

RESOURCES
Qualified competitive intelligence professional
Intellectual property control expert

A. GENERAL INFORMA TION
1.

Provide a brief overview of the company's competitive intelligence department, if any (size, responsibilities, output, etc.). In addition, document the position of the
information control function within the firm. Attach a general organizational chart if necessary.

Attachment Reference:

2.

D

L

h

d titl

Name

f

T~-"

-

h
n

f duties issues.

lved in infl

Title

Attachment Reference:

B. INFORMATION COUNTERMEASURES
A variety of factors make an active countermeasures program an important addition to the obvious benefits to the company, including (Miller, J. p. 218):
1. A due-diligence requirement to ensure that countermeasures sufficient to deter material as well as intellectual property losses are present in the facility
2. To ensure that such measures are consistent with the changing nature of the threat environment as a required element in the event of any future, potential
compromises

INFORMATION CONTROL AUDIT GUIDE
Last Update: April 27, 2001
3. To ensure that the firm meets those industry standards necessary to demonstrate that the firm has undertaken appropriate security measures to protect itself
Moreover, such reporting as may result from this kind of an effort plays an important role insofar as it serves to document the firm's proactive stance on securing sensitive
and proprietary information - a legal prerequisite whenever seeking redress through the court system at any point in the future.

Yes
or No

MEMO

#

REF
1

- - -

Test
Methodology
Review information classifications to determine if
consistent criteria are used to initiate sensitive
information into the protection system. Document
procedures to classify information as sensitive.
Review the criteria for each level of information
classification to ensure that they are fitting and
up-to-date for the circumstances. Compare the
information the company is collecting (or
attempting to collect) on its competitors with
similar data of the c1i~nt company.

2

Does the client company use the proper
evaluation techniques to classify information?

3

Is supplemental sensitive information
protected?

Examine the data surrounding sensitive
information to make certain that it is also placed
in the protection process.

4

Are adequate procedures in place to
"declassify" non-sensitive information?
Is accurate, current documentation of the
protection process' policies and procedures
readily available?

Review the declassification process and document
recent incidents of information declassification.
Request copies of documentation relating to
protection procedures.

5

1.....---.----

Primary Control
Question
Is an acceptable process in place to identify
critical information?

Control
Objective
Sensitivity of information should be evaluated
and sensitive information identified and protected
(Dutka p. 302).
Protection should encompass information that is
most difficult for a competitor to develop without
tacit or active cooperation. This includes
information on subjects like intentions and goals
(McGonagle p. 54). Critical information similar
to that desired of a competitor company,
information that is critical to the client's operation
as a business, and competitive data crucial to
completing a profile of the client company should
all be protected.
A focus should be placed on the subject matter of
information already declared sensitive.
Component parts that would lead a rival business
intelligence function to gain useful insights
should be defined (Miller, 1. pp. 210-211).
Protection should extend to material alluding to
confidential information and material from which
someone could derive critical elements of the
confidential plan (McGonagle p. 54).
Information should only be protected as long as
necessary (McGonagle p. 54).
Documentation is necessary for the formal
establishment of policies and procedures (Dutka
p. 302) and demonstrates that the client company
has taken adequate measures to protect itself
(Miller, J. p. 218). Documentation should be
current and up-to-date (Shaker & Gembicki pp.
213-215).
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6.

Does the protection policy begin with upper
management?

Determine if protection policy statements are
from the company CEO or other appropriate
member of top management.

7

If of sufficient size, does the company contain
a diverse, standing information protection
policy committee?

Review company organization and the
information security process. Interview
appropriate members of management.

8

Are common sources of intelligence regularly
monitored for disclosed information on the
company?

Determine and evaluate the frequency of official
monitoring of common sources of competitive
intelligence (database searches, industry
publications, internet, etc.).

9

Are senior management and the legal
department kept apprised of any deception and
misinformation activities of the company?

10

Are new innovations or developments patented
or copyrighted when appropriate?

11

Is there a designated contact within the
company for ANSIR email advisories from the
FBI?

In discussions with management, determine if any
deception or misinformation activities have
occurred. Confirm any statements with personnel
from the legal, security, and competitive
intelligence functions.
Review R&D procedures. Examine legal
department documents and interview personnel
from the legal department.
In discussions with management and security
personnel, determine if there are one or more
ANSIR intern~l contacts. Document any
individual's name and position.

----

A policy statement from upper management
emphasizes the importance of information
security and the protection process (Shaker &
Gembicki pp. 213-215).
In addition to providing accountability, a standing
committee of appropriate personnel can form and
adjust information protection policy as needed by
business operations. The committee should
contain representatives from a variety of
operational areas (competitive intelligence, legal,
public relations, human resources) (Shaker &
Gembicki pp. 213-215).
The client company should be aware of the type
and quantity of information about it available to
its competitors (McGonagle p. 69). In addition,
vulnerability assessments should be conducted on
a periodic basis (Miller, J. pp. 210-211).
The damage that can occur from a deception
campaign if it is disclosed can far exceed the
benefits derived from its use (Shaker & Gembicki
p.217).
Developments of intellectual property should be
protected by law whenever possible (Smith &
Parr pp. 89-120).
The Awareness of National Security Issues and
Response (ANSIR) Program is the FBI's National
Security Awareness Program designed to provide
unclassified national security threat and warning
information to U.S. corporate security directors
and executives. The company should take full
advantage of any government measures raising
9
awareness of security issues and risks.
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C. RELEASE OF INFORMATION
Yes
or No

MEMO
REF

#

Primary Control
Question

Test
Methodology

1

Are forms of internal communication
(employee newsletters, bulletin boards,
displays, etc.) monitored for sensitive
information?
Is only minimal information provided on forms
intended for external audiences?

Review recent employee newsletters and conduct
a walkthrough of the client company's facilities.
Document any incidents or discoveries of
sensitive information.
Inquire about the procedures and personnel that
are used to complete required external forms. This
may include censuses, surveys, government forms
such as regulatory filings, or communication with
nonbusiness publications.
Observe the preparation of sensitive documents or
review existing sensitive documents. Verify that
such documents are clearly labeled as
confidential.
Randomly select a topic of sensitive information
and review the dissemination process within the
company. Check regularly produced documents
and mailing lists. Document any instance of
information availability to nonessential personnel.

2

3

Are all documents containing sensitive
information clearly marked as confidential?

4

Is sensitive information only available to
necessary internal personnel?

5

Do email messages include an automatic
disclosure (often at the end) stating that
information is for intended recipients only?

Examine email correspondence to determine if
any such statement is enclosed.

6

Is information on the company website
screened and monitored for sensitive
information?

Review website posting policy and interview the
company's webmaster. Search the company's
website for any unnecessary disclosures of
sensitive information.

7

Is information reviewed and filtered by
appropriate personnel before it is released for
research at universities?

Inquire about any recent permitted university
research or projects involving the company.
Review joint research policy, if any.

Control
Objective
Sensitive information may be compromised if
unnecessarily placed in prominent areas or
publications (McGonagle pp. 61-66). All release
of sensitive information should be controlled.
Documents intended for any external audience
should be reviewed to ensure that they do not
contain unnecessary references to sensitive
information (McGonagle pp. 61-66).
Clear markings define documents as sensitive and
confidential to a user uneducated about the
informational contents of the documents
(McGonagle pp. 61-66).
Sensitive information should only by available to
necessary personnel. This includes limiting the
knowledge of the competitive intelligence or
information protection units in the company and
omitting from documents any items no longer
relevant to the audience (McGonagle pp. 59, 8081).
An automatic statement accounts for the
possibility that sensitive information may be
contained in messages and may encourage
message deletion in case of a misdirected
message.
Sensitive information should not be disclosed
unnecessarily. Extensive job listings or executive
changes and profiles may provide insight into the
company's strategies, goals, or objectives (Dutka
p.88).
Sensitive information can be compromised if it is
carelessly distributed under the pretense of
university research (Dutka pp. 306-307).
Sensitive material should not be released.

J
I
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8

Are parties required to enter confidentiality
agreements in the developmental stage of joint
venture or merger discussions?

Review procedures for joint venture discussion.
Interview appropriate management personnel and
discuss recent joint venture or M&A activity.

#

Primary Control
Question

Test
Methodology

The company should monitor and control access
to confidential information or trade secrets that
should not be known by a competitor (Wolf p.
230).

D. SECURITY
Yes
or No

MEMO
REF

Control
Objective

1

Does the company have a trained security
staff?

Interview appropriate management personnel;
review organizational chart.

2

Is access to areas containing sensitive
information controlled and limited to necessary
personnel?
Are employees required to register their entry
into areas where sensitive information is
stored?
Are the company's extremely sensitive
facilities regularly inspected for eavesdropping,
wiretapping, or alteration of
telecommunication system programming?
Are all documents containing sensitive
information disposed of in an acceptable
manner?

Review security procedures and policy. Examine
any entry or security logs of the company.

3

4

5

Review security procedures and policy. Examine
any entry or security logs of the company.
Determine if and how often inspections occur.
Review procedures and interview personnel to
determine who completes the inspection.

The company should have trained security
personnel on staff to provide professional
expertise and accountability (PWC/ASIS p. 15).
Access to facilities or areas containing sensitive
information or material should be limited (Dutka
p. 300; PWC/ASIS p. 27).
Access to facilities or areas containing sensitive
information or material should be limited (Dutka
p. 300; PWCI ASIS p. 27).
Eavesdropping, wiretapping, or alteration of
telecommunication system programming should
be detected (PWC/ASIS p. 21).
-'

Inquire about document disposal process.
Observe disposal of documents containing
sensitive information.

- - - - --- -

----

Rifling garbage in an attempt to cull valuable
information is believed to be the number one
method of business and personal espionage
(McGonagle p. 55). Documents should be
securely and consistently destroyed (preferable
~edded or incinerated).

E. OPERATIONS
1.

HR, Employee education

Primary Control
uestion

Test
Methodolo

Control
Obiective
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1

Are employees advised and/or reminded of
information control procedures prior to any
trade show, interview, or meeting where
competitors may be present?

2

Do employees deal with incoming solicitations
of information in an appropriate manner?

3

Are appropriate employees required to sign
official secrecy and associated (non-disclosure)
agreements?

4

Are thorough background checks conducted of
all employees?

5

Are complete background investigations
completed on the company's non-traditional
workers (especially temporary and contract
staffs)?
Are temporary workers, including interns, not
assigned to projects or work areas containing
sensitive information areas?

6

7

Do employees undergo information security
training upon employment?

Inquire about the preparation procedures for any
such event. Review any preparation documents to
verify that they contain general lists of
information that is too sensitive for specific
discussion.
Review company policy to confirm that
procedures are in place for employees to:
1. Get name, firm, and contact information
of the caller
2. Ask precisely what kinds of information
is desired and the deadline, if any, and
3. Report the contact to a specific
individual in the security department for
follow-up.
Interview and observe employees to ensure that
policy is followed.
Randomly select and review the personnel files of
employees to determine if any such agreement is
utilized. These should include agreements
pledging no competition against current company
programs for a specified period of time should the
employee leave, no raiding of company personnel
to accompany a departed employee, and invention
covenants.
Review hiring procedures and personnel files to
determine if thorough background checks were
performed and documented.
Review procedures for hiring temporary and
contract workers. Examine work contracts.

Interview HR personnel and review recent
assignments for temporary workers.

Review the agenda for new-hires and discuss
training policies with HR personnel.

Sensitive information should not be unwittingly
disclosed by an unprepared employee
(McGonagle p. 67).

Employees should use requests for information to
obtain data about solicitors (Miller, 1. p. 215).

Secrecy and associated agreements limit the risk
of sensitive information being used as a
competitive force against the company (Shaker &
Gembicki pp. 213-215).

Establishing a contact within a company is a most
effective way to obtain confidential information
(Dutka p. 299).
Contract employees and subcontractors are
considered a risk to proprietary information
(Dutka pp. 306-307; PWC/ASIS p. 3).
Temporary workers and interns should not be
assigned to facilities or functions where they will
be exposed to sensitive information (Dutka pp.
306-307; PWC/ASIS p. 21).
Employees should receive information security
training upon employment with the company
(PWC/ASIS p. 15).
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2.

Yes
or No

8

Does the company provide employees with
continued information security training and
awareness?

9

During exit interviews, are employees
reminded of obligations to the company
regarding sensitive information?

Interview HR personnel and policies concerning
continued security training. Examine the
schedules of key employees to ensure that they
have undergone additional security training.
Review the exit or termination procedures of HR.
Interview personnel to ensure that proper exit
interviews are conducted.

In order to safeguard sensitive information,
employees should remain informed about proper
security procedures and any new developments in
sensitive information control (PWC/ASIS p. 15).
Exit or termination interviews reminding
employees of their continuing obligation to
safeguard the trade secrets and proprietary
information to which they had access during the
course of their employment are effective at
preventing many problems and are another
method of communicating the organization's
vigilance in defending its intellectual property
rights (PWCI ASIS~. 27).

Test
Methodology

Control
Objective

1

Are travel plans of key company officials
treated as sensitive information when
necessary?

Evaluate internal access to the travel plans of
executive personnel and the release of travel plans
to the public.

2

Is the discussion of sensitive information
restricted to secure telephones only?

3

Are travelers encouraged to avoid the use of
hotel fax machines?

Review travel and communication procedures for
sensitive information. Interview traveling
personnel to ensure that proper procedure is
followed.
Review travel and communication procedures for
sensitive information. Interview traveling
personnel to ensure that proper procedure is
followed.

4

Are laptop computers used only in secure
locations?

Travel plans of key company officials could
indicate an impending merger or acquisition
(Shaker & Gembicki p. 206). Access to the travel
plans of key executives should be restricted to
necessary personnel.
Public and cellular telephone conversations may
be overheard or intercepted. Discussion of
sensitive information in this manner should be
limited or avoided (McGonagle pp. 78-79).
Because information can be easily seen by hotel
staff or sent to an unauthorized party, the use of
hotel fax machines for outgoing and incoming
messages containing sensitive information should
be avoided (McGonagle pp. 78-79).
Sensitive information on computer screens can be
compromised if a laptop computer is operated in
plain view in a public place (hotel lobby, airplane,
airport concourse, etc.) (McGonagle pp. 78-79).

Travel

MEMO
REF

#

Primary Control
Question

Review travel and communication procedures for
sensitive information. Interview traveling
personnel to ensure that proper procedure is
followed.

I
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3.

Yes
or No

5

Is sensitive information not left unattended in
hotel rooms?

6

Is sensitive information transferred only
through secure lines of communication?

Review travel procedures for personnel carrying
sensitive information. Interview traveling
personnel to ensure that proper procedure is
followed.
Review travel and communication procedures for
sensitive information. Interview traveling
personnel to ensure that proper procedure is
followed.

Foreign hotel rooms occupied by visiting business
executives are common targets (Dutka p. 299).

Fax transmittals and electronic data interchanges
are routinely monitored in some countries (Dutka
p.299).

General, purchases

MEMO

#

REF
1

Primary Control
Question
Are appropriate precautions taken to conceal or
disguise especially sensitive purchases?

Test
Methodology
Review or observe procedures for such purchases
to determine if protection measures are sufficient.
Procedures may include purchasing through
several captive companies or staggering
purchases over a period of several months.
Determine policy and procedure for facility
closings.

2

Is sensitive material eliminated from plant or
facility closing sales?

3

Are sensitive negotiations held in a secure,
unannounced location?

4

Does the company have a safe system in place
to receive competitive bids?

Review procedures for arranging important or
confidential negotiations. Determine that recent
negotiations conformed to Qolicy.
Examine procedures for receiving bids and review
recent bidding processes.

5

Is a thorough background investigation
completed on major suppliers and original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs)?

Review procurement procedures. Determine if
investigations are conducted prior to contract or
order assignments.

6

Does the company assess the security of
partners and vendors?

Inquire about security procedures for the original
establishment of partner or vendor status. Review
current partner and vendor policies concerning the
transfer of sensitive information.

Control
Objective
Important aspects of sensitive information should
be protected. Measures should be appropriate
based on sensitivity of the purchase (Miller, J. pp.
210-211).
Proprietary information, especially advanced
technical material, should be kept confidential or
sold to appropriate buyers only (Fialka pp. 2949).
For security purposes, the location of sensitive
negotiations should be kept confidential (Dutka
pp. 295-296).
Bidding information and the bidding process
should be free from any unauthorized tampering
(Fialka pp. 130-131).
Suppliers and original equipment manufacturers
are often exposed to a large amount of sensitive
company information (Fialka p. 15; PWC/ASIS p.
3). These entities should be investigated before
information is released.
The security of partners and vendors should be
assessed prior to entering into any relationship in
which sensitive material may be transferred
(PWC/ASIS p. 15).

i
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F. PROTECTION COMPROMISES
1.

Yes
or No

General

MEMO
REF

#
1

2

2.

Yes
or No

Primary Control
Question
Does protection policy define what constitutes
an informational security compromise?

Test
Methodology
Ensure that protection policy procedures contain
an appropriate definition of a security
compromise.

Are reaction procedures outlined for situations
involving the compromise of information?

Review policy and protocol to determine that
contingency plans are in place for compromises
of security. Interview employees to determine if
policy has been followed in recent incidents of
compromise, if any.

Control
Objective
Personnel should be able to accurately recognize
when sensitive information has been
misappropriated (Shaker & Gembicki pp. 213215).
The protection policy should specify what
procedures should be taken upon discovery of
compromises and what legal actions and remedies
the company will take. Employees should be
aware of and follow procedures (Shaker &
Gembicki pp. 213-215).

Court Action - Keep in mind that once a trial has begun, everything that is introduced as evidence and all the transcripts of the trial are generally (and usually
automatically) a part of the public record ... While you cannot control what your opponent introduces into evidence, you can ask the court, in advance if possible, to take
special measures to keep such matters in confidence - and out of the public record. (McGonagle 74)

MEMO
REF

# I
1

2

Primary Control
Question
If court action is initiated, does the company
have the other side sign an agreement
(stipulation) to keep certain documents or
information in confidence?
Is a request made of the judge to enter a
protective order controlling who sees the
discovery and under what circumstances?

- -

Test
Methodolo2Y
Review the company's procedures for court
action. Discussion with the company' s attorneys
or legal department may be necessary.

Control
Objective
Disclosure of sensitive information should be
limited in court proceedings (McGonagle p. 74).

Examine the client company's procedures for
court action or interview appropriate personnel in
the legal department. Review recent court cases,
if applicable.

Sensitive information in court rulings should be
controlled if possible. A protective order of the
judge supervising the discovery may have the
parties place discovery documents in a location
where they are subject to inspection only, but not
copying, if they are very sensitive (McGonagle p.
74).

I
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G. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Yes
or No

MEMO
REF

#

Primary Control
Question
Are sensitive files encrypted within the
company's computer system?

Test
Methodology
Review the company's computer security policies
and procedures. Interview system personnel to
ensure that policy is adhered to.

2

Is the company's computer security equipment
installed and updated on the computer system?

3

Are employee passwords kept secure and
changed at least once a month?

4

Are one-time password generators used for
important computer entries and alterations?

5

Does the company require screen saver
passwords on all computer terminals?

Review the company's computer security policies
and procedures. Interview system personnel to
ensure that policy is adhered to. Examine
.computer files to verify that security software is
in use and current.
Review the company's computer security policies
and procedures. Interview system personnel to
ensure that policy is adhered to.
Review the company's computer security policies
and procedures. Interview system personnel to
ensure that policy is adhered to.
Examine one or more computer terminals to
determine if screen saver passwords are standard.
Interview IT personnel and review policy.
Review the company's computer security policies
and procedures. Interview system personnel to
ensure that policy is adhered to.

1

6

Does the company encrypt data transmitted
over the internet?

7

Does the company use only licensed software?

8

Are digital forms of sensitive information
secured comparable to hard forms?

Examine installed software on computer terminals
to ensure that only official, licensed versions are
installed.
Review the company's computer security policies
and procedures. Interview system personnel to
ensure that policy is adhered to.

Control
Objective
Sensitive information should be protected in
electronic format. Encryption provides an
additional level of protection for information
contained in computer files (Fialka p. 15).
Sensitive information should be protected in
electronic format. Security equipment aids in
protection only if it is installed and used properly
(Fialka p. 15).
Access to the company's computer system should
be limited to authorized personnel (Fialka pp.
101-112).
Providing a new password for each important
computer entry ensures that entries will not be
duplicated (Fialka pp. 101-112).
Screen saver passwords reduce the risk of
unauthorized access to sensitive information on
unattended computers (PWC/ASIS p. 15).
Sensitive information should be protected in
electronic format. Encryption provides an
additional level of security assurance (PWCI ASIS
p. 15).
The use of licensed software limits the risk of file
corruption or compromise by illegal or altered
software code. (PWC/ASIS p. 15).
Sensitive information should be protected in
electronic format with the same enthusiasm that it
is [.>rotected inp~[.>er format (PWC/ASIS p. 15).

!
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End Notes
lIn a 1985 proposal of Information Resource Management (IRM), Diebold (p. 41) states
that IRM means "Managing information as a resource in much the same way that other
corporate resources are managed."
2Tritter (p. 14) asserts, " ... a business risk is anything that threatens achievement of
business objectives. Such risks could be environmental, such as the strength of national
economy ... The majority of business risks, however, are internal. .. Business risks can be
easily analyzed in CSA [Control Self-Assessment] sessions, and proper solutions can be
put in place to strengthen the company's responses to them."
information is found at the Federal Bureau of Investigations website: Intellectual
Property Crimes section <http://www.fbi.gov/programs/fc/fifu/about/aboutipc.htm>

3This

~his quote is found on the website of the Society of Competitive Intelligence
Professionals (SCIP) <www.scip.org> and in Appendix C, an overview of the
Competitive Intelligence field compiled by the SCIP.

information on legal strategies for protection of IP rights, see Simensky 15.1-15.54.
For information on proactive auditing ofIP, see Simensky 7.1-7.9. An intellectual
property audit is an internal review of the intellectual property rights (IPRs) of a business
and how those rights are managed.

5For

press release for this final incident is found on the U.S. Department of Justice
website at <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/Estrada.htm>

6The

7The majority of this list is found at the Defense Security Service's counterintelligence
website <http://www.dss.mil/cithreats/protect.htm>. The added points were discovered
through additional research.
following Operations Security (OPSEC) information is compiled from information
found in Shaker & Gembicki pp. 206-207 and Miller, J. pp. 221-224.
8The

further information on the Awareness of National Security Issues and Response
(ANSIR) program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), see the FBI website at
<http://w\\.w.fbi.gov/programs/ansir/ansir.htm>

9For
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Appendix A:
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP and the American Society for Industrial Security,
International
Trends in Proprietary Information Loss
Survey Report
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American Society for Industrial Security/PricewaterhouseCoopers

Trends in Proprietary Information Loss
SURVEY

REPORT

Key Survey Findings
• In 1999, Fortune 1000 companies sustained losses of more than $45 billion from thefts
of their proprietary Information.'
• Forty-four companies of the total 97 that responded reported a total of over 1,000 inci-

SPONSORED B Y AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY INTERNATIONAL ( ASI S)
AND PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP

dents of thefts. Of these, 579 incidents were valued with a total estimated loss of nearly $1 billion dollars. The average company responding reported 2.45 Incidents with
estimated losses per Incident of over $500,000. The vast ml!Jorlty of the reported Incidents were in High Technology (530) and Services organizations (356). Although
Manufacturing reported only 96 inCidents, the acknowledged losses of manufacturing
companies accounted for the

The Nature of the Proprietary Information Loss Problem

m~orlty

of losses reported in the survey, and averaged

almost $50 million per incident.

Key Survey Findings

• The global Internet and proliferation of information systems have significantly
increased the risks to corporate proprietary Information,

Survey Question Responses

• The greatest known losses to American compan ies are In manufacturing processes and

tv

-..)

25

Is the Loss of Proprietary Information a Serious Problem?

27

What Should Be Done to Protect Proprietary Information?

research and development information.
• The number of reported incidents per month has increased dramatically within the last
17 months.

28

I

Conclusions from the 1998 Survey
• Forty-five percent ct companies responding to the American Soc iety for Industrial
SecurltylPricewaterhouseCoopers ("ASISlPricewaterhouseCoopers") survey Indicate

About the Respondents

29

one or more incidents of information loss, theft and/or misappropriations.
31

I

Selected References
• On-site contractor employees and original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are now
perceived by companies responding to the survey to present the greatest threat to

ASIS Safeguarding Proprietary Information Committee Members

32

corporate proprietary Information.
32

I

PricewaterhouseCoopers Investigations
• The ml!Jorlty of companies responding to the survey have not effectively met the
challenge of providing a framework In which to safeguard proprietary Information.
• Consistent mechanisms and processes for determining the value of proprietary
information are not In place at most Fortune 1000 companies.

I

For the ptlposes of this StXVey we are Umlting our definition of proprietary information to that information

which is not within the public domain and which the owner has taken some messures to protect. While

c CoPYright 1999 American Society fa< Industrial Security, International and PrlcewaterhouseCoopers LLP.

corn ~

monly referred to as "trade secrets, " this information is typically protected under both State end Fedorallaw.

The Nature of the Proprietary
Information Loss Problem
Propnctary mformrlt/on protect ion
diffels significantly from the ocher
security disciplines.

Over the past few years th is annual report has highlighted the fact that documented

Competitive Intelligence gathering has become an essential part of international bus i-

Till,' loss of proprwtary IIlceflccCLIal

losses of trade secrets and other proprietary information cost US companies tens of

ness. Many organizations are fearful they w ill be left beh ind if they don 't use every

assers through unethical or I/Iega/

billions of dollars annually. Recent high profile incidents involving mi!ior U.S.
companies Illustrate that m isappropriation of sensitive proprietary Information has

means at their disposal to gain a competitive edge over their r ivals. This has resulted

become a serious problem afflicting many business organizations. Th is year,

and accurate information is available. While many "ethical " intelligence practitioners,

PricewaterhouseCoopersjolned with ASIS to conduct the Trends in Proprietary

such as the members of the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP)
adhere to professional codes of conduct, the field is also populated w ith practitioners

means co~ts busmesscs Significant
amounts of lost profits and
reduces new opportunities for
fwUlc buslncss success.

Information Loss Survey in an effort to raise awareness of these important strategic

In

many companies forming specialized intelligence gathering units, to ensure time ly

issues throughout the business commun ity and among corporate counsel and sen ior

concerned solely w ith achieving results . Some practitioners, such as " retired " person-

management, in particular.

nel from foreign governmental clandestine Intelligence services, may resort to patently
Il legal means to obta in Information.

Although 70 percent or more of the market value of a typical US company resides

N

00

In intellectual property (IP) assets, typically formali zed valuation procedures do not

The loss of proprietary intellectual assets through unethical or Illegal means costs

exist and thus these assets are not tracked In corporate accounting systems: Since the

businesses significant amounts of lost profits and reduces new opportunities for future

value of IP assets is not well established, they are often not well protected, thereby

business success. In extreme cases It may result In the total loss of the business.

contributing to the current problems associated w ith theft of trade secrets and

Information gathered through the ASIS/Pri cewaterhouseCoopers Trends in Proprietary
Information Loss Survey suggest that monetary losses and other negative business impacts

proprietary information.

from theft, misappropriation and infringement will Increase in the foreseeable future.
Proprietary information protection differs significantly from the other security d iscipl ines. It differs from computer and network security services, as the focus is on
managing and protecting the intangible assets In whatever medium or form they ex ist,
which may not be limited to computerized forms. It also differs from the classic physi cal security services even though it may involve guard forces and alarm systems. The
challenge facing security professionals Is to improve proprietary information protection through a more systematic cooperation with the corporate legal department,
compliance, human resources and the business units to address the many forms of
"non-physical " harm to the enterprise. The primary focus of these coordinated efforts
should be on preventing and responding to theft, m isappropriation or infringement of
the client's intellectual property rights In the physical world as well as addressing the
new challenges ar ising from the vast increase in electronic commerce and operations
in cyberspace.
Proprietary information assets are vital to the success of many, perhaps most businesses at the end of the 20th Century. The importance of these assets, while often not
formally " valued " by many companies, cannot be underestimated. In tOday's h ighly
competitive environment, It is essential for American businesses to recognize that the
intellectual assets of every business are highly sought-after commodities .

Survey Question Responses
The Survey instrument will be available on the ASIS web site at

2. Please rank each in terms of the GREATEST RISK of losing

www.asisonllne .org. The questions and responses have been summarized
and charts provided where appropriate to highlight significant findings and
observations. To facilitate the analysis of the responses, organizatIons have
been allocated to four main groups : Manufacturing, High Technology,
Financial/Insurance or ServIces.

1. For each of the items listed, how high or low

N

'"
The lhmar posod by persons
wlthll1 tile o rgwllzatiol1 15 sttll
considered to be a primary (h mill
(D corporate mforrnfltion.

highest, 4 -

(1 -

Greatest Risk, 10 -

Infolm..\lon Category

IS

the

potential threat to your company's intellectual property (IP)?
(1 -

this type of information.

lowest)

InSldeB

Score

EKlemal

Current Employees
On-site Contractors
Former Employees
Vendors/Suppliers
Strategic Partners
OEMs

2.46
2.29
2.74
2.81
2.64
2.27

Domestic Competitors
Foreign Competitors
Computer Hackers
The Media
Intelligence Services

Average

2.53

Average Score

Scot·.,

2.82
2.93
2.75
3.28
3.28

Least Risk)
.

Customer Lists
Financial Data
R&D
Merger/Acquisition
Strate8!c Plans
Unannounced Product Specs
2nd P~ Information
Prototypes
Manufacturing Data

Seore

4.16
4.46
4.72
4.84
4.86
4.92
5.07
5.50
5.63

High Technology companies consider the greatest risk Is associated with losing new product specifications (4.05) and research and development (4.16). Loss of such information
early in a high tech product's lifecycle could result In a competitor gaining sufficient time
to bring to market an equal or superior product with similar features and performance.

3.01

The threat posed by persons within the organization Is still considered to be a primary
threat to corporate information. Responses to this question were consistent with each
of the previous surveys. This year OEMs (original equipment manufacturers -

the

companies that provide components. sub-assemblies and the like) edged out current
and former employees as the top concern: OEMs are perceived to represent the greatest threat to both FinanCial/Insurance and Manufacturing while on-site contractors are
perceived to be the greatest risk for High Technology and Services firms.
The average score for all insider relationships was 2.53, suggesting a higher than
average threat. The common factor in these relationships is that these groups are
privy to the trade secrets and proprietary information of the company using their
services. The levels of concern expressed by respondents suggest that more efforts
may be appropriate to manage these risks.
Outsiders were, at best, considered to pose only a medium to low level of threat.
Interestingly, intelligence services (whether governmental or private) are not, according to the respondents, considered to be a significant threat. Only High Technology
respondents expressed significant concerns about foreign competitors, the other
industry groups apparently finding them to be an average threat. The media was a
below average concern to virtually all respondents.

Financial/Insurance respondents were most concerned about loss of customer lists
(2 .75) and second-party Information (3 .35). Financial/Insurance organizations demonstrate priority concern with losses of second party information. Customers!
clients of such organizations often entrust personal and private information to the
company, and such organizations are privy to credit reports, medical and other forms
of information loss or unauthorized disclosure of which could subject the company to
liability. as well as adversely impact customer confidence.
Manufacturing companies were most concerned about research and development
information (4.16). Services companies were most concerned about financial data
(4.00). Manufacturing concerns about the loss of R&D information may indicate that
the longer lead times required to bring a new manufactured product to market Is significant, so greater losses could be expected from that type of information. Services
firms are apparently most concerned that their greatest risks derive from loss or failure
to safeguard their financial data. Lacking physical or tangible products, they may
be most harmed by loss of their financial forecasts, metries used to cost services or
other activities.

3. During the past year, (i) approximately how many times has
your company lost the specified information and (ii) what was
$5 Billion or Less
$6-15 Blllion
Over $15 Blllion

the approximate dollar value of the actual loss?

Oollar lost

TOlal Number

Numbl>r or Con'panics

Number 01

Industn,,1 Category

Reportod

or COl11panons

Reporting Incidents

InCidents

Numbl>r or
Incidents Vatued

High Technology
FinanciaVInsurance
Manufacturing
Services

$119,825,000
$2,055,000
$871,295,000
$5,252,000

20
20
31
26

530

252

41

18
13

96
356

$196,112,000
$606,280,000
$196,035,000

38

18
18
11

33

26

441

324

108
474

178

77

Medium sized companies appear to have sustained the most significant losses.
Regardless of how the data is sorted, proprietary information losses are far greater
than any other type of security-related loss to the company.

39
280

4. How much did loss of information contribute to
The average company
rospondll1g ICported 2.45
mcidcms with oSlimaled los.5(~s

per mCldent of over 5500.000.

The Survey responses indicate that manufacturing companies experienced the largest
losses, due to loss of research and development Information and manufacturing data.

the Identified problems for your company between

Manufacturing organizations reported losses of nearly $900 million in 39 incidents.

January 1, 1997 and June 1, 1998?

Significantly, these same companies only Indicated the risk to such information
was average (5 .23).

w
o

(1 - significant, 2 -

somewhat, 3 -

did not contribute)

The most frequent reported losses were to high technology companies that lost
customer lists and data. Survey respondents reported more than 226 incidents of loss
of such data. Small companies (under $5 b illion) suffered losses of research and
development information. Due to their smaller size, losses experienced by smaller
companies may be much more harmful to their survival and future success. High
tech companies reported their largest losses from " unauthorized distributions of
product specifications." This may explain why they noted the greatest concern about
such losses because a loss of this sort would allow competitors to rush to market
equivalent products.
The disparity in both numbers of incidents and financial impact between the

Loss of Competitive Advant~e
Loss of Market Share
Loss or Revenue
Increased R&D Costs
Embarrassment
Increased Legal Costs
Increased Insurance Costs
Average Score

2.41
2.53
2.17
2.12
2.41
2.00
2.41
2.29

2.15
2.10
2.00
2.10
1.95
2.15
2.20
2.09

2.35
2.38
2.35
2.42
2.35
2.19
2.69
2.39

2.29
2.38
2.19
2.76
2.05
2.05
2.33
2.29

2.30
2.35
2.18
2.35
2.19
2.10
2.41
2.27

Manufacturing/High Technology companies and the ServiceslFlnancial/insurance
groups is significant. Financial companies are governed by strict rules that are derived
from governmental regulations about information security and as such would be

It appears that there are two ml!joi consequences of loss of information to many

expected to have better systems in place to deter and detect such losses. The majority

companies (especially High Tech and Services). The first is embarrassment, which is

Embarrassment and legal cos!
were reported as the two miljor

of incidents where respondents provided a specific value for a loss in the Services

tied with increased legal costs for the problems created for companies. It is difficult to

cons/!qtJ(!r1CCS of loss of

group involved copyright infringements.

place a monetary assessment on intangibles such as embarrassment or adverse public-

inlorrrltlflOn to many companies

ity, but the potential consequences can translate into very tangible financial losses if,
The data looks more consistent when sorted by revenue size.

for Instance, shareowners abandon a publicly traded company based upon a publicized information loss Incident.
The second major consequence, legal costs are very real and represent costs to litigate or prosecute for known or suspected cases of theft or infringement. Legal costs
also include any supplemental efforts to protect existing patents, copyrights and

9

trademarks against infringements. Given that legal costs to litigate a single patent suit

business are included in the assessment. the Financial/Insurance group potential goes

The greatest known losses

may exceed $1 million dollars. it is obvious that litigation is a very expensive means of

from 4 .71 to 3 .47 .

CO AmcnCfm companies are

enforcement. especially when an organization may have dozens to hundreds of
patents and other IP to defend .

H igh Technology respondents believe their greatest potential losses der ive from unauthorized disclosure of proprietary product specifications. The greatest potential losses

Increased Insurance costs were the least important consequence of information loss.

for Financial/Insurance respondents. are considered to be from customer lists and

Information losses tend not to be covered by business insurance. at least in part

data . Manufacturing noted substantially more concern over research and development

because there is a lack of effective mechanisms to consistently value information .

Information rather than manufacturing data itself. even though actual losses were

Insurance companies may also be reluctant to issue policies for assets that are not

nearly three times higher for manufacturing data than R&D Information. Services firms

valued or do not have firmly establ ished guidelines on how to safeguard them .

were most concerned about losses of strateg ic plans and road maps.

In man(Jfacturing procr!sses
and msearch and deve/opmcnc
information

Companies with revenues over $15 billion and companies with very h igh percentages
of temporary employees generally seemed more concerned with losses of research
and development. Companies with revenues less than $5 billion were most con-

5. Rank each of the types of information to indicate

cerned about losses of financ ial data.

the GREATEST POTENTIAL DOLLAR LOSS from losing
this type of information.
(1 -

Greatest Risk. 10 -

Least Risk)

6. During the past year, please indicate the approximate

One purpose of this question was to determine any consistency between the informa-

VJ

......

tion loss experience of the respondent companies and their internal assessments of

number of times that your company engaged in each of the

what could impact them the most.

following activities:
1) Litigation to enforce IP rights;

Customer LlstslData

5.12

2.78

4.68

4.36

4.22

Financial Data

5.76
3.47
5.00
4.11
2.94
6.17
5.06
5.53
4.79

3.22
6.28
3.00
4.94
5.28
3.39
6.61
6.94
4.71

4.62
2.97
4.86
4.21
4.41
5.59
4.79
4.38
4.01

4.18
5.36
4.14
3.82
4.82
6.23
5.59
6.18
4,96

4.44
4.52
4.25
4.27
4.36
5.34
5.51
5.76
4.74

R&D

Merger!Acquisition
Strategic Plans
Unannounced Product Specs
2nd Party Information
Prototypes
Manufacturing Data
Average Score

While customer lists/data were thought to pose the greatest risk to revenue loss they
in fact accounted for just one percent of reported losses. There were 296 incidents
of customer lists/data loss; however. the total value assigned to those losses was
only $13.196.000.

2) Inspecting competing products to determine if they Infringe on IP rights;
3) Hiring an outside firm to evaluate potential infringements;
4) Hiring a firm to determine If the organization was infringing on others
IP rights .
Most respondents did not report any engagements In IP litigation. although High
Technology organizations seemed to have a higher propensity toward IP litigation
than the other Industry segments. likewise. only High Technology was reported to
have engaged In Inspecting a competing product to determine whether It Infringed on
patents or other IP rights. None of the industry segments were especially likely to h ire
outside firms to evaluate potential Infringements or to determine if the company was
infringing on others IP rights.

7. What percent of all IP lawsuits involving your company
are currently pending?
The responses indicate that of those who reported IP litigation. most organizations
have between 0-25 percent of all IP lawsuits currently pending. This may Indicate that

It would appear that companies in Manufacturing perceive the revenue impact

the m'!Jority of suits have been settled .

greater. but that is deceiving. When only Information types d irectly related to their

10

11

8. What percent of all IP lawsuits does your company

11 . Which item MOST FREQUENTLY caw-.es a valuation of

generally settle before trial?

intellectual property?

The responses indicate that about half of the IP lawsuits involving the company are

(1 -

Most Frequent, 4 -

Least Frequent)

settled before trial.

9. How many IP negotiations does your company currently
have underway to avo id litigation?
Most respondents, regardless of industry segment had few pending suits and reported
they generally settled between 26-50 percent of IP lawsuits prior to trial. High

His!! Technolo~
Financla1lInsurance
Manufacturing
Services
Average

2.06

2.06

2.18

2.81

2.39

2.39

2.28

2.38

2.15
2.15

1.84

2.32

1.87

2.03

2.02

2.32

2.32

1.74

2.63

2.46

2.15

2.27

2.02

2.46

2.23

Technology companies were more likely than others to engage in IP negotiations to
avoid litigation, but this did not appear to be a widespread practice.

Litigation and transactions (such as mergers and acquisitions or divestment) are the
most common factors cited by respondents for events that trigger an IP valuation .
Manufacturing respondents appeared to value information for cause more frequently
than the other three groups.

10. How often does your company vallie intellectual property?
(7 -

W

never, 2 -

rarely, 3 -

~nce a year,

4 - more than once a year)

N

IndU\lry CaIL'!JOI'Y

'

,

."

High Technology
FlnanclaVInsurance
Manufacturing
Services
Average

12. Who is responsible for valuing intellectulli property
Score

2.33
1.89

in your company?
Attorneys, espec ially in-house counsel, are more than twice as likely to be responsi -

2.61

ble for valuing IP as either the CFO or outside experts. Although this appears to be a

2.37

common practice, attorneys may not have all the necessary training, experience or

2.30

tools to perform the more complex methodologies that are now generally available to
generate accurate IP valuations,

Few organizations engage in any sort of regUlar review of their intellectual property
valuations, The most common answers were that IP Is never or rarely valued ,
Somewhat surprisingly, Manufacturing organizations appeared more likely to engage
in a more formal and scheduled process than High Technology companies, Large
organizations (those over $15 billion in revenues), were more likely to have a process

13. The THREE most Important factors conSidered when
valuing intellectual property.

whereby on at least an annual basiS IP is valued .

12

IndusltlMI CaIC!JOlY

lSI

High Technology
Flnancia1lInsurance
Manufacturing
Services

Competitive Advantage
Competitive Advantage
Competitive Advantage
Competitive Advantage

2nd

Incremental Profit
Incremental Profit
R&D Costs
Incremental Profit

lid

R&D Costs
Other licensing agreements
Royalties eamed from licensing
R&D Costs

13

In valuing IP, respondents indicated that the most important factor considered is how
much it contributes to competitive advantage. In descending order of importance,
respondents indicated the following when asked to rank the most important factors In
valuing IP: the incremental profit associated with the IP; research and development
costs in creating the IP; royalties that could be earned by licensing out the IP; and the
benefits the IP would bring to other license agreements covering similar technology.

14. The THREE most important factors considered
when valuing damages associated with the theft of IP.
2nd

Industrial Category

lst

High Technology
FlnanciallInsurance
Manufacturing
Services

Loss of Competitive Advantage
Loss of Competitive Advantage
Loss of Sales
Loss of Competitive Advantage

3m

Loss of Market Share
Loss of Market Share
Loss of Market Share
Loss of Market Share

Loss of Sales
Loss of Sales
Loss of Competitive Advantage
Loss of Sales

Respondents Indicated that when valuing IP thefts, the most Important factor they
consider is loss of competitive advantage; loss of market share is second; and loss of
sales was the th ird most common response.

w

w

16. How often does company take the precautions listed
below to prevent information loss?
(1-A/ways; 2 -

Sometimes; 3 -

Rarely: 4 -

Never)

To facilitate discussion, answers In these areas were grouped into administrative,
physical and Information systems security as follows:
AdmlnlStrallve

PII)'SIC~.'1

Inronnalton Systems Sncunty

Information security training
upon employment
Non-Disclosure Agreemenls

Restrict vendors' access
to physical spaces
Restrict access to
sensitive materials
Safeguard off-site
meetings. conferences.
trade shows
Require workforce to
protect while traveling

Use only licensed software

Provide Continued Info
Security Training and
awareness
Classify. handle materials
properly
Use distinctive markings
Assess security of
partnerslvendors
Destroy sensitive materials
when no longer needed

Use screen saver passwords
Encrypt Data over the
Internet
Secure digital form of
Information comparable
to hard

Provide security staff
Secure sensitive materials
when not In use

This was not meant to be an exhaustive list of information protection measu res, but a
representative sampling. Based on these groupings, respondents are most likely to
Implement information systems security measures to protect information and least
li kely to consider physical measures listed above.

15. Which regulatory groups require your company
to protect information?
(Multiple answers are perm itted)

The U.S. Federal Government appears to have the largest impact on companies from
a regUlatory perspective, being cited more than twice as often as the other choices.
However, in the very near futu re this Issue will become much more complex as new
and more extensive privacy laws impact the Information flow facilitated by electronic
commerce. This is an especially important issue for US companies do ing business in
the European Union. Notably, 31 respondents indicated that no regulatory authority
required them to protect the ir company's proprietary information.

14

Indus.rial CalcgOlY

Federal

High Technology
FlnanciallInsurance
Manufacturing
Services
Totals

11

15
16

Sial<!

None

. Admm"trallVn

PhYSIcal

ISS

Avf'.rugo

1.65
1.86
1.74
2.04
1.82

1.84
1.88
1.88
1.80
1.85

1.74
1.46
1.69
2.02
1.72

1.74
1.73
1.77
1.95
1.79

Finance/Insurance respondents took slightly more precautions while the Services
group took the least.

11

4

12
10

27

31

11

53

local

Induslrlal CatogOf)'

High Technology
FinanciallInsu.rance
Manufacturing
Services
Averages
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17. For each of the following statements, indicate whether you

17(c). Information losses are always reported to

strongly agree (1), somewhat agree (2), somewhat disagree (3),

law enforcement.

strongly disagree (4), or have no opinion (5).

There appears to be almost universal agreement on this issue. Given the relatively
strong results above (where 1 represents always and 5 never) it appears that law
enforcement Is not receiving many of the Information loss incidents that are known to

17(a). Information security is a priority within my company.

----I
lndultria.lGttegory
•
•
•

HI\11 TecI1nology
Financial/Insurance
Manufacturing
U ServIces

the responding organizations. This could be due to many factors. Perhaps local. state
and federal agencies are perceived as being ill -

equipped to handle the magnitude

No group of respondents answered that they " strongly agree", and thus no group

of the problem. The complexity and immediate nature of these Issues compete poorly

claimed very strong management support. However, the High Technology respondents
Indicate that information security is more of a priority than in the other three groups.

with more violent crimes. In add ition, there may be serious concerns that Information

This group had the largest number of reported inCidents for the survey, which may

unfavorable consequences to the reporting organization. There may also be a desire

have influenced the score. Financellnsurance companies were a close second.

on the part of many companies to pursue civil remedies in lieu of reporting such

Services respondents indicated that they only somewhat agree that this is a priority.

cases to law enforcement.

loss incidents reported to law enforcement may result in adverse publicity and other

Indu.triol Cotosory
•

Average

•

HI\11 Technology
FinanciaJllnsurance

•
•

Servtces

Man,-"oclUring

Average

w

~

Figure Plb)

Score

(

,.". ,.00

"16

---j

17(b) . The Internet. networks and computers have created

17(d). My company's temporary and contract staffs have

significant new threats.

complete background investigations.

Regardless of the Industry, many respondents indicated that they "strongly agree" that

While on-site contractors are considered to be one of the greatest threats to organ iza-

the Internet, networks and computers have created significant new threats. It seems

tional information, most companies did not require these people to undergo back-

that respondents acknowledge that the drive to computerize and connect company
systems to the global Internet is a new risk factor that deserves serious attention from

ground checks. Background Investigations represent a level of "diligence" easily available to US-based organizations. The failure to ensure consistency between standards

those responsible for protecting the organization's intellectual property and sensitive

applied to the regUlar and temporary/contract staffs creates a gap that could expose

proprietary Information. Although all industry groups displayed a high degree of con-

the organization's key IP and proprietary information to people who have a history of
committing Illegal acts.

cern, the Services group showed incrementally more agreement. This may derive from

Figure 17(d)

Score

a concern that the "product" of such an organization may be dependent on reports,
models and other computerized intangibles rather than physical product.

Ind",lri.1 c.U,sory

Industrial Cltegory

• HI\11 Technology
II Financial/Insurance

.. Financiaillnsurance

•

• Manufacwrlng
II ServIces

Manufacturing
ServIces

Awrage

16

•

H'\11 Technology

Awrage

17

figur\l 17(c)

17 (cont'd) . For each of the following statements, indicate whether you

Score

strongly agree (1), somewhat agree (2), somewhat disagree (3), strongly
disagree (4), or have no opinion (5) .

17{g). My company has effective guidelines for safeguarding

F,!,uro 17(9)
Score

proprietary Information.
Guidelines designed to protect proprietary information are viewed as effective at
most companies, but may not be fully Implemented throughout the corporations .

17(e). Management takes necessary precautions to prevent
information loss.

---j

Consistent company-wide implementation is likely to become even more difficult as
corporations increasingly globalize their operations and must contend with diverse
legal as well as cultural and sociological factors.

There is a significant divergence between these responses and the ones In 17(a). The
difference indicates that existing programs probably have some degree of management support, but that in practice, precautions to prevent information loss may not
always be followed. Taken together these two responses seem to show that even large

Industrial Category

companies have yet to link strong management commitment to protection and consis-

.. H lghTec/lnOlogy

tent compliance w ith precautions needed to safeguard that information and prevent

•

Financial/Insurance

loss of their proprietary information and intellectual property.

•

Manufacturing

Indu,trialColtegory
•

•

fi Services

HlghTec;l1nology

Financial/Insurance

•

Manufacturing

"

Services
Average

Average

w

Vl

F'llure 17(1)

Sane

17(f). OEM/partner companies provide adequate safeguards

17(h). Law enforcement effectively responds to Information

for my company's information.

loss incidents.

These responses indicate how complicated the world of business has become. This

Survey respondents apparently believe that law enforcement organizations need to

score was seven percent lower than the earlier one about precautions within the
company it!jelf. The new on-line and Increasingly outsource business environment Is

become more effective at investigating information loss incidents. However, information loss incidents are inherently very difficult to investigate. Without the complete

moving rapidly to global supply chains that involve tens or hundreds of companies

cooperation of the injured party, a well -trained staff (for both the law enforcement

working transparently to design, manufacture. and deliver goods and services to con-

agency and the business). and the ability to quickly respond, these investigations are

sumers around the world . Most respondents apparently believe that business partners

virtually Impossible to conduct.

Figure 17{h)
Score

are not doing as much to protect the company's information as they themselves do.
This gap could develop from failure to communicate and/or enforce the standards of
the owning company as a condition of the business relationship.
Industrial Cltegory

18

•

H igh Technology

•

Flnanciall1nsuraoce

•

Manufacturing

Industrial Category
•

H igh Tedlnology

"

Financia l/Insurance

1: ServIces

•

Manufacturing

Average

•

Services
Average
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Figure 17 (\)

17 (cont'd). For each of the following statements, Indicate whether you
strongly agree (1), somewhat agree (2), somewhat disagree (3), strongly
disagree (4), or have no opinion (5) .

17(k). My company has detected eavesdropping, wiretapping

figure 17(k)
Score

or alteration of telecommunication system programming.
Eavesdropping, wiretapping or alteration of telecommunications systems programming
was not detected at a significant number of the responding companies. It is possible

17(i). Recent (within 12 months) information loss incidents
could seriously affect my company.

----I

that incidents are occurring but are not detected. If respondents do not perform
regular inspections, or if the Inspections do not utilize eqUipment, procedures and
personnel that are technically up-to-date, they may not detect attacks.

There were fairly consistent responses indicating information loss incidents were not
considered to be a serious problem. However, losses due to misappropriation or theft
of trade secrets are typically much higher than losses that can be attributed to thefts of
tangible products. The discrepancy may indicate there is a lack of appreciation for the
extent of the problem of information loss. It seems that even security professionals do

Ind ...tri.1
•

f lnanclaVlnsurance
Manufacturing

"
•

Services
Average

•

ambivalent response is that information protection measures may not receive strong

HlghTlld1noIogy

•
•

IndultrlalCatesory

not fuily appreciate that information loss is a significant issue. One danger of this

c.~ory

H igh Technology

"

Financial/Insurance

advocacy during budget processes. This could mean that the meager resources Indi-

•

Menufacturlng

cated in the last survey, «3 percent of security budgets spent on Information safe-

•

ServIces

Average

guarding), may be at serious risk of reduction If the need arises to cut budgets.

W

0\

Fi gure 17U)

170). My company has effective information systems

17(1). Temporary/contract employees are not assigned to

security procedures.

projects or worl<'. areas containing sensitive information.

Score

'.0- (

U

----j
Industrial Category

The respondents uniformly believe that Information systems security is not completely

The respondents Indicate that contractors and temporary workers may have nearly the

effective in their companies. The overall score indicates a neutral position.

same access to sensitive information as regUlar employees. The same problem arises

Information systems security consists of policies, procedures, hardware, software,

with the contractors and temporaries that work for other companies such as

audits, and monitoring. One essential element not yet mentioned is administrative

suppliers, vendors or sub-contractors that have access to your company sensitive data.

1'19ure 17(1)

Score

m~or

sanctions for not foliowing the program. If there Is no down side risk to ignoring such

When these comments are combined with 17(d) (which indicate few temporary or

procedures then the entire program suffers and vulnerabilities often increase.

contract employees receive background investigations) It Is possible that a major risk
to a typical organization's critical IP and sensitive proprietary Information arises from
the lack of controls over the hiring and deployment of the "contingent" workforce.

Indu,lriolC·tesory
•

•

High Technology

•

Financial/Insurance

•

Manufacturing
Setvtces

HlghTod1noIogy

JJ flnancial/lnsurance
•

MonulllCtUring

•

Setvtces

Average

AII8fII!J8
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Flguro 17(m)

17 (cont 'd) . For each of the following statements, indicate whether you

Score

strongly agree (1), somewhat agree (2), somewhat disagree (3), strongly disagree (4), or have no opinion (5) .

18. To whIch of the following industry groups does your

Figure 1 B
Number

company belong?
To facilitate better analysis the survey respondents were assigned to one of 4 main
groups: Transportation was grouped into Manufacturing, and Wholesale or Retail

17(m) . Sensitive information is seriously at risk

Trade was grouped Into Services, High Technology and Finance/Insurance remained
as originally identified. The table to the right gives the numbers in each group.

in my organization .
Financellnsurance respondents were the most concerned about their current Information environment. Their concerns may stem from the governmental oversight they
face. Service companies were again the least concerned . Notably, Manufacturing
companies reported that they sustained the greatest proprietary Information losses,
yet they appear to be relatively unconcerned .
InduttrjalCategory

Industrlal Category

•

High Technology

•

•

Financial/Insurance

•

f inancial/Insurance

•

Manufacwnng

•

Services
Average

•
•

Manuf8C1Urlng
ServIces

H ighTochnoIogy

Total

W
-.l

figure 11(n)
Score

17(n). Government intelligence/business intelligence/competi-

19. Approximately what are your company's annual revenues?

t ive intelligence staffs have successfully targeted my company.

The responses show that the companies in this survey represent a wide range of

The respondents clearly Indicate that intell igence gathering threats are of considered
to have minimal Impact to their companies. These answers support the proposition

Figur e 19

Number

organizations with 38 Indicating they were $5 billion or less in revenues, 33 were
between $6 and $15 billion and 26 were over $15 billion.

that known information losses remain principally an insider threat.

- --- -- '/

Ind ...triol Category

22

•

High Technology

•
•

Financial/Insurance
Manufacturing
ServIces
Awrage

Revenue Catesory

• SSBllllonorLess
fI 56-15 Billion
•

OverS15 Blilioo
lOlaI
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f,gure 20

20. Approximately what percentage of your company's

Number

total work force

IS

comprised of full time regulars,

temporary/regular part time?

Is the Loss of Proprietary
Information a Serious Problem?

The responses to this question show that the average company has about 80 percent

----,/

of employees as regular/full time staff. with nearly 10 percent temporary work force

While reported thefts of proprietary Information and the level of concern about the

as well as about 11 percent as regular staff who work a part time schedule. A related

threats are low. companies and the professionals dedicated to protecting their ideas

response in question 17(d) shows that many. perhaps most. companies do not yet

should not underestimate the impact that a single incident can have on a company. If

ensure background investigations are conducted on temporary staff. Similarly, the

a company hasjust one proprietary information loss Incident but that Incident affects

responses to 17(1) indicate many organizations make no effort to avoid assigning tempo-

the bottom line of the organization. this can create serious competitive and financial

rary or contractor employees to prqjects or work areas containing sensitive proprietary

challenges that extend far into the future.

In 1999.1=01 tune 1000 companies
sustained los5es of morc [han
545 billion (,0m thefts of their
proprtctary information.

Information. The combination of these three elements: a significant number of
contract/temporary staff; with unverified backgrounds/credentials; assigned to work In an
WorkiorceCatcgory
•

5%orlessTempStatr

•
•

6·19%TIIrT1jlO<OIyStaff
20% or more Temps
T0181

organization's most critical or sensitive areas. or prqjects. could ultimately be disastrous.

In addition. Survey respondents are likely to under-report incidents for at least two
main reasons. First. many organizations lack the means to detect such losses and procedures to Investigate or document Incidents when they do occur. Second, there may
also be concern that reporting losses could only adversely impact the reputation of
the organization if It ever became publicly known.
Forty-five percent of responding companies indicate known incidents of Information
loss. As such. the potential losses deriving from incidents of information loss for all

w

respondents may exceed $4.4 billion and the potential losses may reach nearly
$45 billion by straight-line extrapolation of these results to the Fortune 1000.

00

The types of information and the estimated losses by Industry segment are also instructive.
Number

21. Approximately what percentage of your company's total

F,guro 21

workforce is located outside the US?

In Manufacturing. the loss of manufacturing Information comprised nearly three-fourths of
the total losses ($610 million of $871 million) with research and development information
as the next most substantial losses in the amount of a little over $215 million.

The responses to this question show that about 79 percent of the workforce of the

High Technology companies reported nearly $120 million In direct losses. but the

respondent companies work in the United States. while six percent work In North

respondents reported the greatest average number of incidents with nearly 67 inci-

America (Canada and Mexico) and 15 percent are located elsewhere In the world.

dents per company with average loss per incident of about $15 million.

This demonstrates the Increasing importance of the globalization of business. It Is
important to consider that most global organizations support their overseas operations

----j

Services companies eXhibited a more uniform distribution of losses with customer

with a global network. This connectivity from remote non-US locations poses addi-

lists/data comprising about half the known losses followed by nearly equal losses

tional challenges to the security of sensitive proprietary Information and especially for
the digital forms of Intellectual property. The "weakest link" in the safeguards for criti-

from merger/acquiSition and strategic planning types of information. Interestingly.

cal proprietary information may well be in a small representative office in another
country where employees enjoy easy access to the company Intranet.

the Services companies reported many incidents (356). more than three times the
manufacturing incidents. but the average losses per Incident were less than $20,000
per event.

Intern..tionalStatul
• 2% or less
• 3·40%
II OVer40%
T0181
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W hat Should Be Done to
Protect Proprietary Information?
The

III (mtJfJr

of r(~ported

IIlcld(.'nrs per manti) t)(lS

mcr('asQd dramallcally within
the last 17 months.

Financial/Insurance companies reported the smallest total number of incidents but the
average losses per

event were

nearly $350,000.

A well executed safeguarding proprietary information (SPI) protection program should
commence with an inventory of the key intellectual assets of the organization, as well
as valuation of these assets. Once this is accompl ished the organ ization shou ld per-

If the reported figures are accurate, then the estimated dollar loss In US-based compa-

form a risk assessment and determine which assets are adequately protected and

nies from these types of events may exceed $40 billion annually. This estimate tracks

wh ich may be at risk . In the Inventory and risk assessment it is important to consider

closely w ith numbers that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other authori -

the impact of the global Internet and the Increasing digitalization of critica l proprietary assets.

ties have prepared. This Is a large number and' shou ld be a m~or concern in any

The rmljortly of comparJIcs
responding 10 tho surv!!y have nO!
offectively metlhe ciwl/enge of
p,ovldmg a fWlTlework In which to
safeguard proprietary Informal1on.

company. However, It is important to apprec iate that the precise number of the losses
is much less Important than the fact that losses occur in every Industry, and that many

Basic protection measures rema in necessary. All employees (temporary, contract and

may be preventable.

regu lar staff) shou ld be subject to background Investigations and required to sign non-

The most surprising result revealed by th is survey Is that many, perhaps most,

all forms of proprietary information. Physical restrictions, espec ially over visitors and

American companies do not appear to be taking steps to value their Information and

other outsiders, which limit access to organization faci lities and to areas containing

disclosure agreements that clearly enumerate the organization's ownership rights over

intellectual properties. In the absence

VJ

\0

at some sort of assessed

value, it Is difficult to

val uable proprietary Information, especially trade secrets, are essentia l. Exit or termi-

know how much of corporate assets are at risk or whether the organization is making

nation Interviews reminding employees of their continu ing obl igation to safeguard the

appropriate Investments In protecting proprietary information and other va luable Intellectual properties.

trade secrets and proprietary information to which they had access during the course
of their employment are effective at preventing many problems and are another

At present, random circumstances, such as mergers and acquisitions, appear to drive

property rights. These reminders shOUld parallel efforts to prevent term inating staff,

most valuation efforts. Although at present there is no commonly available procedure

and others, from physica lly taking hard copy documents, notebooks, prototypes and
other tangible proprietary materials belonging to the organ ization.

method of communicating the organ ization's vigilance In defending its intellectual

for val uing IP, it is frequently required and accompl ished during licensing negotiations, as well as for litigation when it Is known or suspected valuable IP may have
been stolen or misappropriated.

The advent of the fully networked enterprise where intranets, extranets and the
Internet are all used to gain competitive advantage has significantly Increased the
importance of integrating digital and information systems security measures Into the
SPI program. The corporate security professional must now must work even more
closely with the CIO (chief information Officer), the systems security staff as well as
the organization law department to ensure the organization 's IP protection measures
address the Increased risks from connectivity and the Internet. These protective measures must include efforts to identify and safeguard digital Intellectua l assets inside the
networked enterprise. However, given the speed and propagation of Information,
internal security measures must be supported by an external monitori ng and surveillance function.
In Question 16 of the Survey we provided 18 common precautions that a company
could implement to prevent Information loss, and we asked the Respondents to Ind icate how frequently they actually used such measures. Although the result showed
that most organizations are using most of these measures at least some of the time,
this is alarming because It is not enough. A well-executed SPI program would use all
of these measures most of the time. As a group, the Services firms generally appear to
have the most work to do, while Financial Services/Insurance organizations arguably
cla im the best compliance.
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LOS$ of mtel/c.:.'CturJl property iJnd
s(in~itive
,1

propnetary mformatl()n is

contmUing thrcac 10 the health
an(i compc/ll1veness or the
Amencan economy.

Conclusions from the

About the Respondents

1998 Survey

The survey received responses from 97 qualified companies, which equates to nearly

The loss of proprtetary information is a serious threat facing

a 10 percent response rate for the Fortune 1000. There were 26 Services, 21
Financellnsurance, 20 High Technology, and 30 Manufacturing companies. The typical responding company has 80 percent of its staff working In the United States.

American industry.
This threat applies in both global and domestic marketplaces. Loss of intellectual
property and sensitive proprietary information Is a continuing threat to the health and
competitiveness of the American economy. The current survey identifies nearly $45
billion worth of proprietary information lost in a 17-month period .

The annual revenue breakdown of respondents is as follows: 40 percent had revenues
of less than $5 billion, 33 percent had revenues between $6 billion and 15 billion,
and 27 percent were over $15 billion.)
As In past surveys, larger companies submitted the preponderance of responses.
Because the survey forms are sent to Fortune 1,000 companies, the survey is pr~u

Those with a trusted relationship to the company pose a seri o

diced toward companies with large revenues.

ous threat.
In contrast to our previous surveys, this Survey reveals that It Is not current or former

~

o

Employees

employees that are considered to be the greatest threat to an organization 's propri-

FUll -time personnel average 80 percent versus 9 .2 percent part-time employees and

etary information and Intellectual property. This year, on-site contractors and OEMs

11 .2 percent contact staff. One of the details that emerge upon close study of the

have been identified as posing the most serious threat to proprietary information. This

responses is that there are some areas where temporary and contract workers may be

result parallels many of the cases brought under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996.

creating avoidable risks for company. When conSidering threats to trade secrets and

In several of these cases the individuals Indicted have been either a contracted staff

efforts to manage risk to proprietary Information, distinctions between kinds of work-

member or a temporary employee of the victimized company.

ers are increasingly Important.

The Internet and associated technologies are perceived as
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This survey Is the latest in a continuing series sponsored by ASIS International and is

confidentiality of their proprietary information.
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This survey seeks to broaden and deepen the understanding of security professionals,

form In the enterprise, the advent of the fully networked organization can create huge
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risks to these digital assets.
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survey is designed to provide benchmark data on proprietary Information loss, Its

Businesses of all sizes are affected.

Impact, or methods of manag ing risk to proprietary information. Most of the material
reported in these surveys is extremely sensitive. We appreciate the continued support

Even though the majority of the reporting businesses are relatively large, having $6-
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of security professionals whom candidly assessed their own companies' performance

$15 billion or greater annual revenues, smaller companies were also affected by

and shortcomings. Without this candid reporting. the value of these surveys would be

information loss. This multifaceted issue affects them all because every size and type

substantially d iminished . According to the PricewaterhouseCoopers Survey Center, the

of business has sensitive proprietary Information such as customer lists, customer pref-

Survey results are statistically valid plus or minus 10 percent. The reader should be

erences, pricing Information, Innovations, future business plans, and prqjected sales

cautious In extrapolating from only the responses received to specific conclusions for

and revenues figures that are at risk of theft or misappropriation.

every company In the Fortune 1000.
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Appendix B:
Written by Leonard Fuld, a pioneer in the Competitive Intelligence (CI) field and
founder/president of Fuld & Company, a Cambridge, MA consulting firm.
Competitive Intelligence Is and Is Not:
Ten descriptions of what CI is and does for a company and ten common misconceptions
about CI; found at <www.fuld.com>.
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Competitive Intelligence Is ...

Competitive Intelligence Is Not ...

Information that has been analyzed to
the point where you can make a
decision.

Spying. Spying implies illegal or unethical
activities. While spying does take place, it
is a rare activity. Think about it;
corporations do not want to find
themselves in court, nor do they want to
upset shareholders. For the most part, you
will find spies in espionage novels, not in
the executive suite.

A tool to alert management to early
warning of both threats and
opportunities.

A crystal ball. There is no such thing as a
true forecasting tool. Intelligence does give
corporations good approximations of
reality, near- and long-term. It does not
predict the future.

A means to deliver reasonable
assessments. Competitive intelligence
offers approximations and best views of
the market and the competition. It is not a
peek at the rival's financial books.
Reasonable assessments are what
modern entrepreneurs such as Richard
Branson, Bill Gates, and Michael Dell
need, want, and use on a regular basis.
They don't expect every detail, just the best
assessment at the time.

Database search. Databases offer just
that - data. Of course it is wonderful to
have these remarkable tools.
Nevertheless, databases do not massage
or analyze the data. They certainly do not
replace human beings who need to make
decisions by examining the data and
applying their common sense, experience,
analytical tools, and intuition.

Comes in many flavors. Competitive
intelligence can mean many things to many
people. A research scientist sees it as a
heads-up on a competitor's new R&D
initiatives. A salesperson considers it
insight on how his or her company should
bid against another firm in order to win a
contract. A senior manager believes
intelligence to be a long-term view on a
marketplace and its rivals. See our
Strategic Intelligence Organizer tool on
fuld.com for examples of the many flavors
of competitive intelligence and tips on how
.
to develop it.

The Internet or rumor chasing. The Net
is primarily a communications vehicle, not
a deliverer of intelligence. You can find
hints at competitive strategy, but you will
also uncover rumors disguised as fact, or
speculation dressed up as reality. Be wary
of how you use or misuse the Net. Its
reach is great, but you need to sift, sort,
and be selective on its content.
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A way for companies to improve their
bottom line. Companies, such as
NutraSweet, have attributed many millions
of dollars in earned revenue to their
intelligence usage. See our CI Success
Stories on fuld. com for over 100 excerpts
telling how companies have used CI
successfully.

Paper. Paper is the death of good
intelligence. Think face-to-face discussion
or a quick phone call if you can, rather than
paper delivery. Never equate paper with
competitive intelligence. Yes, you must
have a way to convey critical intelligence.
Unfortunately, many managers think that
by spending countless hours on computergenerated slides, charts and graphs, and
footnoted reports, they have delivered
intelligence. All they have managed to do
is to slow down the delivery of critical
intelligence. In the process, they have
likely hidden the intelligence by overanalyzing it. Remember: Paper cannot
argue a point - you can.

A way of life, a process. If a company
uses CI correctly, it becomes a way of life
for everyone in the corporation - not just
the strategic planning or marketing staff. It
is a process by which critical information is
available for anyone who needs it. That
process might be helped by
computerization, but its success rests upon
the people and their ability to use it.

A job for one, smart person. A CEO
might appoint one individual to oversee the
CI process, but that one person cannot do
it all. At best, the CI Ringmaster, the
coordinator of the program, keeps
management informed and ensures that
others in the organization become trained
in ways to apply this tool within each of
their SBUs.

Part of all best-in-class companies. In
my 20 years of consulting in this arena, I
have witnessed that high-quality, best-inclass corporations apply competitive
intelligence consistently. The Malcolm
Baldridge Quality Award, the most
prestigious total quality award for American
corporations, includes the gathering and
use of external market information (a.k.a.
CI) as one of its winning qualifications.

An invention of the 20th century. CI has
been around as long as business itself. It
may have operated under a different name,
or under no name at all, but it was always
present. Just review the story surrounding
19th century British financier Nathan
Rothschild, who managed to corner the
market on British government securities by
receiving early warning of Napoleon's
defeat at Waterloo. He used carrier
pigeons, the E-mail of his day. He knew
the information to watch and how to make
sense of it; in the end, he used this
intelligence to make a killing in the market.
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Directed from the executive suite. The
best-in-class intelligence efforts receive
their direction and impetus from the CEO.
While the CEO may not run the program,
he dedicates budget and personnel; most
important, he promotes its use.

Software. Software does not in and of
itself yield intelligence. The CI market is
hot, and numerous software houses are
producing products for the intelligence
marketplace. Many more are repositioning
existing software - in particular, data
warehousing and data mining packages for use in intelligence. Software has
become an important weapon in the CI
arsenal, but it does not truly analyze. It
collects, contrasts, and compares. True
analysis is a process of people reviewing
and making sense of the information.

Seeing outside yourself. Companies that
successfully apply competitive intelligence
gain an ability to see outside themselves.
CI pushes the not-invented-here syndrome
out the window.

A news story. Newspaper or television
reports are very broad and are not timely
enough for managers concerned with
specific competitors and competitive
issues. If a manager first learns of an
industry event from a newspaper or
magazine report, chances are others in the
industry already learned of the news
through other channels. While media
reports may yield interesting sources for
the CI analyst to interview, they are not
always the most timely, or specific enough
for critical business decisions.

Both short- and long-term. A company
can use intelligence for many immediate
decisions, such as how to price a product
or place an advertisement. At the same
time, you can use the same set of data to
decide on long-term product development
or market positioning.

A spreadsheet. "If it's not a number, it's
not intelligence." This is an unspoken, but
often thought of, refrain among managers.
"If you can't multiply it, then it is not valid ."
Intelligence comes in many forms, only one
of which is a spreadsheet or some
quantifiable result. My firm has completed
numerous strategic assessments, where
the numbers only address one aspect of
. the problem . Management thinking,
marketing strategy, and ability to innovate
are only three among a host of issues that
rely on a wide range of subjective, nonnumeric intelligence.
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Appendix C:
Compiled by the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals.
An Overview of the Competitive Intelligence (CI) Field
This PowerPoint presentation is available at <www.scip.org>.
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What is Competitive Intelligence (eI)?
CI is a systematic & ethical
program for gathering and
analyzing information about
your competitors' activities
and general business trends
further your own company'
goals
Adapted from "Competitive Intelligence " by Larry Kahaner

What Intelligence Can Be Obtained Legally
and Ethically?

80%-90% of
all information
is public
knowledge
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What is the CI Function and Process?

Communicate

Adaptedfrom William Y. Wilson, NextStep and Timothy W Powell, InfoStrat.

What Principles and Skills are Needed for the
Function?

V"V''''UP'''''' by SelP in association with the Monitor Company
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Where Are the Sources For CI?

Sources of CI (by extent of use)

Very little use

• Clipping services
• Security analysis
• C-om~tors (contact directly)
• Personal interviews
• SupplierS

• Product purcbasiJig
• Freeddm of information act
• FocU$ groups
• Case studies
• Mail ~estionnaires

Based on the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals 1997 Salary Survey
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Who Are the Best Internal Clients
For CI?
Market
Planning
& Research

Financial
Planning

D
Based on the Society ofCompetitive Intelligence Professionals 1997 Salary Survey

What Methods Are Available to Gather
CI?

~

Comparative
profiles

~TQM
~ Benchmarking
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~
~

Bas,elining
CI systems

How Are Organizations Using These
Methods?
7%

of companies

Dedicated CI professionals
at corporate & divisions.
Department specialists
tending to develop &
use their own intelligence.
Dedicated staffs for
organization of
information only.
Part-time responsibility
of corporate librarian.

900/0 of companies

ad hoc

full-time

What is the Framework For Accessing, Sharing, and
Utilizing CI Across the Organization?
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Can Companies Have the Right Intelligence, B
Not Share or Utilize it Effe . · ely?

How Can You Create Structures For Using CI
Effectively Within a Company?
I

'~issemination of C
Modes of Dissemination (In order of perceived effectiveness)
• Custom reports
• Computerized databases
• Personal communications • Newsletter
• Presentations
• Regular meetings
• Special memos
• Training Seminars
• E-mail
• Bulletin Boards
• Competitor files
• Special Retreats
Based on the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals 1997 Salary Survey
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How is Information Made Available But
Improperly Employed at High Levels?
Decision
makers don't
act in a
.omely maDDe

Information
is incorrect
or incomplete

is
isinterprete

Decision
makers .
isunderstan
CI

Organizations Don't Make Decisions,
People Do.

What Should You Consider When Setting Up
and Maintaining an On-Going CI Process?

What Is the Objective
of the Program and
How Is It
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How Do Y ou Ensure That CI is
Strategy Driven?

CI Professionals' Roles Within
Organizations
Market Planning & Research
• CIIAnalysis

o Strategic Planning
25%

o Info Center/Services
12%
R&D, Business Development,
Product Planning
• Financial
Planning/Counterintelligence .

26%
Based on the Society of Competitive intelligence Professionals 1997 Salary Survey
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Who is in the CI Field?
Type:

Work in:

Doing:

Practitioners
76.8%

A corporation

Ad Hoc requests (50010) to
tracking (50%)

Vendors or
Consultants
17.5%

Independent consultants or
consulting practice

Strategy applications of
developed CIon project &
subscription basis seminars

Academics

A university or college

Teaching research methods.
Authoring books in CI
business. Proiect consulting.

A university or college

Full-time studies.

2.1%

Students
3.6%

Based on the membership of the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals

CI Professionals' Demographics
52% 1-3 years
17% 4-5 years
23% 6-12 years
10% 1-5 years
16% 6-10 years
42% 11-20 years
$63,000

Years in CI profession:

Professional work
experIence:
Median salary:

73% 1-3 per unit
22% 4-10 per unit
93 % university education
65% advanced degrees

Size of CI staff:
Education:

Based on the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals 1997 Salary Survey
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SCIP Membership
Growth Trend
# Members
8000 ~----------------------------------------

7000+--------------------------------------6000 +----------------------------------:
5000+-----------------------------~£
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+--------------------------
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2000
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1000

o
'90

'92
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'93
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'95
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'98

The Industries of SCIP Members
Healtbcare
Public Utilities
Industrial
Defense/Aerospace

"',

• U

Banking/Financial
Computers

. 11

Information
Chem.lPharma.
Communication

%

Consulting

6

2

4

6

8

16

Based on the Society o/Competitive Intelligence Professionals 1997 Salary Survey
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12

"Advantage is a better
soldier than rashness."
William Shakespeare,
King Henry V

society
of
competitive
intelligence
professionals

"The model for management that
. we have right now is the opera ...
yet business should be emulating
a good jazz group ... you have to
develop the score as you go
along."

Peter F. Drucker,
author and management
consultant
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N

,

"We are drowning
in information but
starved for
knowledge."
John Naisbitt,
Chairman of the Naisbitt Group

"You don't just set your
compass and head south
- or you will quickly run
aground. Instead, you
i steer from point to point
according to how the river
is running and the
obstacles that appear in
your path."

Abraham Lincoln
on how to govern
as one would steer
a riverboat
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Appendix D:

Managing Sensitive Information in a Joint Venture
This overview contains specific recommendations for documentation and management of
confidential information in a joint venture.
Compiled from information found in Wolf pp. 230-233.

- 60-

The confidentiality agreement
The confidentiality agreement appears when the parties, even operating with the
clear understanding that they are in an exploratory phase, are asked to exchange
or give access to information of a confidential nature, trade secrets that should
not be known by competitors. It would not be unusual for a confidentiality
agreement to be executed after considerable negotiations between the parties
and it is an agreement naturally prepared by legal counsel.
The confidentiality agreement has become an important complement particularly
in industries or services where the secret of the business is not in patented rights
or technology licenses but in trade secrets, commercial practices that cannot
receive formal, written protection, such as a copyright, but that nevertheless are
crucial to the success of the enterprise. A typical example is a specialized mailing
list built up through the years and that is productive for mail-marketing purposes.
No information should be disclosed without a proper agreement defining the
responsibility of all parties. It is not that the law requires a written agreement. A
verbal agreement may be perfectly enforceable. However, if the information is of
serious commercial value, the vagueness and ambiguities that characterize
verbal agreements are sufficient for choosing a formal agreement instead. The
agreement should be reduced to writing and the solemnity of its terms
emphasized. This will contribute to its being voluntarily implemented.
Breach of a confidentiality agreement subjects the defaulting party to a claim for
damages. However, this right is more theoretical than practical. When large
corporations are involved, the agreement surely has an important moral force.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs seeking damages for breach of the confidentiality
agreement have a difficult burden of demonstrating what are the damages
incurred and, if the information is disclosed to unauthorized third parties, its
circulation in the commercial world cannot be prevented easily.
Inserting a statement as to the agreed-on damages for default in the
confidentiality agreement may not be a valid clause, a question for local counsel,
but in any event, unless the amount is very high, out of proportion to the value of
the secret, it is an invitation to disclosure if the information gained is worth more
than the penalty to pay.
There is a serious dilemma in confidential transactions for the seller. For the
buyer to request to have access to the records and information of the seller is a
normal solicitation. It may not even be possible to seriously consider a joint
venture without having more information. There thus arises a conflict: If
information is not revealed, there can be no further progress; if information is
revealed but negotiations fail, valuable information has been given away. How
can this be resolved? Two suggestions are a clear delineation as to what is the

- 61 -

confidential information and then its managed disclosure according to some
simple rules. The possibility of damages should be considered as a last resort.
Defining the subject matter of confidential information
The most important subject matter is what it is that is being considered
confidential. Merely stating that all information given is confidential does not
contribute to clarity; nor stating that all information of a commercial nature
constitutes a trade secret; nor claiming all confidential information belongs to the
seller. A serious effort must be made to define as well as possible what is meant
by confidential information; such a description then can be followed by general
clauses of confidentiality. The more detailed the description, the more important
will seem the material sought to be protected.
The management of confidential information
Negotiations begin. An interest is confirmed. Further information is requested.
Even with an agreement, there is no need to rush to deliver all confidential
information available. Certain guidelines can be established subsequent to the
signing of the confidentiality agreement:
• Management should separate vital knowledge from information that is a natural
activity in most companies. How to make a product is very different from where
you purchase the materials. The latter is also important but not critical. Insider
information then should be divulged in harmony with the advance of negotiations.
As negotiations become more close to a contract, the quality of the knowledge
being given can also increase, become more unique in its application.
• Information should be given only after a certain level of agreement is reached
on major issues. One does not r.eveal confidential 'information merely because
another party may have interest. The level of interest is difficult to determine but
there surely should be agreement on price and the equity contribution of each
party.
• The information can be given initially in written summaries. This establishes a
reference for what areas are considered confidential and the buyer is put on
notice.
• Representative information can be given. It is not necessary to furnish a copy of
an entire client list broken down by city and products. Sample information can be
given.
• The buyer or potential partner should have to channel his requests in a formal
procedure, and if possible to the same party. This tends to make personal the
assumption of the confidentiality obligation and also establishes a simpler
method of proof should the condition be broken.
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• For the same reason, releasing the information should be done in the same
room and in a formal manner. This emphasizes the seriousness of the
information being given. A rapport may develop between the participants, which
contributes to honoring the promises of confidentiality given.
• A point often overlooked is a failure to place a limitation on the copies of
information made and in general controlling the copy process. The more there
are formalities, the more serious the information received will be considered. It
would be perfectly advisable to record how many copies have been made of any
item, to whom given, and when.
• The entities entitled to receive the information should be defined as narrowly as
possible, for example, auditors, financial officers, attorneys, and specified
categories of key personnel.
• A decision has to be made as to the consequences of a misuse of the
information received. Two options are to make all parties responsible who
misuse the information and the other is to have one primary party responsible,
the buyer who must take the necessary precautions with third parties, such as
employees. It is simpler to place the responsibility on the inquiring buyer as this
is likely to be a corporation and be able to respond in damages.
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Appendix E:
Competitive Intelligence and the Economic Espionage Act:
An overview of the EEA and its impact on the CI field.
Prepared by the Society for Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP).
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Introduction
In October 1996, the u.s. president signed into law the Economic Espionage Act
(EEA). The EEA makes stealing or obtaining trade secrets by fraud (and buying or
receiving secrets so obtained) a U.S. federal crime. Upon passage of the EEA, some
members of the competitive intelligence (CI) community expressed concern that the
EEA could have implications for the conduct of CI.

After the passage of the EEA, SCIP organized two symposia, one in February 1997
and another in February 1998, on the topiC ofCI, ethics, and law. The purpose of these
events, and of several publications and articles published by SCIP, was to promote
education and understanding of the law and its implications for the CI profession
among SCIP's membership and in industry at large.
Many members of the Society felt it was important to develop a clear statement to
define the impact of the EEA on the CI profession and clear up any confusion about the
relationship between the EEA and CI. This policy statement, the result of extensive
research and consultation, addresses that relationship. The policy statement was
prepared by Richard Horowitz, a SCIP member who is an attomey and private investigator. It was subsequently adopted by the SCIP board of directors and endorsed by
leading legal experts. Their endorsements are also included in this booklet.
Competitive intelligence is the legal and ethical collection and synthesis of data
and information to enhance business decision making. SCIP members endorse this
definition.
- Ava Harth Youngblood, SCIP '98-99 president

selP Code ofEthics for Cl Professionals
• To continually strive to increase respect and recognition for the profession.
• To pursue one's duties with zeal and diligence while maintaining the highest
degree of professionalism and aVOiding all unethical practices.

• To faithfully adhere to and abide by one's company's policies, objectives and
guidelines.
• To comply with all applicable laws.
• To accurately disclose all relevant information, including one's identity and
organization, prior to all interviews.
• To fully respect all requests for confidentiality of information.
• To promote and encourage full compliance with these ethical standards within
one's company, with third party contractors, and within the entire profession.
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POLICY ANALYSIS

Introduction to the SeIP
Policy Analysis on
Competitj"e Intelligence and
the Economic Espionage Act

Competitive IntelHgence and the
Economic Espionage Act

Prepared by Richard Horowitz, Esq.
For the board of directors of Society of Competitive
Intelligence Professionals

Richard Horowitz. Esq.
Legal and Investigative Services
400 Madison Avenue. Suite 1411
New York. NY 10017. USA
Tel.: +1.212.829.8196
Fax: +1.212.829.8199
RHESQ@compuserve.com

Executive Summary
Seeking competitive information in a legal and ethical
manner is an integral component of healthy competition.

Under the auspices of the SCIP ethics committee and
as requested by the SCIP board of directors. I have
prepared this policy analysis. adopted by SelP's board of
directors.
The question of the EEA's effect on CI has been an
issue of concern in the CI industry. I believe that the
significant diffICulty for many in understanding what
effect if any the EEA has on CI is that this issue reflects a
confluence of law and security. two topics that are not
generally included in a college or graduate school education. For example. the EEA is a statute. and a statute is not
prose. Statutes are written without incorporating the
underlying legal principles into their wording. The frustration many have felt after reading the EEA and still not
understanding how it affects CI is because these underlying legal principles which are essential to understanding
the law's application Will not emerge from the text. regardless of fonts. graphics, or the statute's layout on the page.
I have always maintained that CI practitioners who
act consistently with SCIP's code of ethics should not run
afoul of the EEA. It is my hope that this policy analysis will
assist members of the CI industry to understand why this
is so. For those who would like a more in-depth analysis.
see my article "The Economic Espionage Act: The Rules
Have Not Changed" in the July-September 1998 volume of
Competitive Intelligence Review.
I would like to thank Elkan Abramowitz, Mark
Halligan, Peter Toren and the board of directors and staff
ofSCIP for their assistance in the preparation of this document. A special thanks to Mark. Peter and Hamilton Loeb
for their assistance to me since I took an active role in this
issue. In case there are any further questions. I can be
reached at the address above.
Richard Horowitz

The EEA was enacted in order to enable federal law
enforcement to investigate and prosecute acts of
economic espionage. It adds federal criminal penalties to
activities which were already illegal under state law. The
EEA does not interfere with the way corporations are entitled to gain a competitive advantage in the marketplace
by seeking information on a competitor in a legal manner.
That the EEA does not materially affect competitive
intelligence (CI) does not mean that CI professionals need
not be concerned about trade secret law. On the contrary.
the EEA has drawn attention to the necessity of insuring
that CI activities are within the parameters of trade secret
law.
An understanding of trade secret law and the EEA
indicates that CI professionals who have been and will
continue to conduct their business in an ethical manner
and consistent with established trade secret law need not
be concerned about the EEA debate~

. Companies that have curtailed their CI efforts out of a
misplaced fear of the EEA have awarded a competitive
advantage to companies whose CI activities continue
unimpeded.

Background
The Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals
(SCIP) is the global professional society for practitioners
of business or competitive intelligence (CI). Established
in 1986. SCIP tooay has more than 5.000 members and
continues to grow substantially year after year.
Seeking information on a competitor is an important
component of healthy competition; CI is the term which
has developed to describe this profession. Many corporations and executives perfonn this function without any
formal ties to the CI profession. while others employ CI
professionals or outside CI firms and practitioners. Many
large corporations have established entire CI departments. Competitive intelligence is a recognized.
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or processes of manufacture. Were it otherwise,
the fIrSt person in the field with a new process or
idea would have a monopoly which would tend to
prevent competition (Section 757, Comment a).

accepted, and legal way for businesses to gain a competitive advantage in the marketplace. This in turn accelerates
the benefits to society of competition in the marketplace.
SCIP encourages its members to abide by its code of
ethics; one clause in the code instructs its members to
"accurately disclose all relevant information, including
one's identity and organization, prior to all interviews."
The Economic Espionage Act of October 1996 (EEA)
was enacted by the U.S. Congress in response to attempts
by foreign entities to steal American trade secrets. It was
not enacted in order to regulate the CI industry nor was it
enacted in response to any problems arising out of the
activities of CI professionals. Its passage however has led
to various and sometimes conflicting opinions regarding
the EEA and has created confusion regarding its implications for the practice of CI.
The EEA is a federal criminal law and was passed in
order to enable federal authorities to investigate and prosecute acts of economic espionage.
Federal authorities charged with the responsibility of
protecting national security and the national economy
were confronted with the reality that laws dealing with the
theft of trade secrets were state law, and needed a federal
law to give them the authority to investigate and prosecute the increasing number of cases of economic espionage conducted by foreign entities. The EEA was passed
to do just that.

One limitation on this rule cited by the Restatement
is: "It is the employment of improper means to procure
the trade secret, rather than the mere copying or use,
which is the basis of liability in this section."
Information collection performed by CI professionals
centers around the sophisticated use of published material, databases, and on-the-record interviews, techniques
which themselves are legal and proper means of acquiring
information.
Second, properly trained CI professionals who have
conducted themselves in an ethical manner were not
engaged in legally risky business prior to the EEA. The
appropriate legal principles have been instilled into the CI
profession over the years of its existence and subsequently adopted as practice by properly trained industry
members. The increased penalties for trade secret theft
under the EEA will not be-applicable to those whose practice has been consistent with the already existing legal
standards.

Third, most situations commonly referred to as "gray
zone" areas are not trade secret violations at all. Though
they raise ethical questions. -gray zone" situations such as
rmding a lost document in the street, overhearing
competitors talk on a plane, having a drink with a
Congress decided however that the scope of the EEA . competitor knowing you are better at holding your liquor,
would include the theft of a trade secret by anyone, for
removing your name tag at a trade show, or even falsely
anyone. In other words, the EEA is not limited to theft of a
identifying yourself as a student, are situations which
trade secret for a foreign entity, but encompasses theft of
alone will not trigger trade secret liability. Properly trained
a trade secret by and for a domestic competitor.
CI professionals should be able to identify and avoid the
predicaments that would place them in actual legal risk.
Herein lies the confusion. While the EEA makes trade
secret law a federal criminal matter - this for the first time
Fourth, the EEA will not be applied to general
in U.S. history - the activities it criminalizes had always
commercial disputes, but to clear criminal acts of theft.
been prohibited under state law and/or inconsistent with
The reason for the EEA's passage was to thwart attempts at
SCIP's code of ethics. In other words, the rules are fundastealing American trade secrets which would have an
mentally the same but the consequences of violating them
impact on the competitiveness and health of the Ameriare different. An activity that had always been a violation of
can economy. That the U.S. Attorney General promised
state trade secret law can now result in not only state civil
Congress that no charges will by filed under the EEA for
liability but federal criminal liability as well.
the fIrst five years after the law's enactment without the

Implications
There are several reasons why the EEA should not
have any impact on the practice of competitive intelligence.
First, the act of seeking and collecting information on
a competitor is itself legal. Note the following from the
Restatement of Torts (1939):

approval of the Attorney General or two of her top
deputies indicates that federal authorities have no intention of becoming entangled in the numerous trade secret
disputes that do take place in the routine course of business (see Congressional Record. October 2,1994, S12214).
To summarize, the EEA incorporates into the federal
criminal code activities that were already illegal under
state law. It does not add new burdens or restrictions to
the American workforce.

The privilege to compete with others includes
a privilege to adopt their business methods, ideas.
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A Note on btratenitoriaHty
About twenty percent of SCIP's membership is
outside the USA, making the question of how the EEA
affects overseas activity pertinent.
The EEA does have an extraterritoriality clause. In
principle, a statute must state that it applies overseas for it
to so apply. The extraterritoriality provisions of the EEA
apply the statute to a U.S. citizen even abroad, and to a
non-U.S. citizen (1) while on U.S. soil or (2) abroad, if the
act committed abroad violates the EEA and "an act in
furtherance of the offense was committed in the United
States."
What this means in practice is that whatever types of
activities the EEA prohibits overseas are the same as what
is prohibited on U.S. soil, which, as explained, had always
been prohibited by state law and! or inconsistent with
SCIP's code of ethics.

EEA CompHance Plans
An additional reason for concern regarding the implications of the EEA on competitive intelligence has been
the many calls for "EEA compliance plans" based on the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Sentencing Guidelines do not instruct, dictate, require, prescribe, or obligate a company to have a compliance plan. The Sentencing
Guidelines, the manual by which federal judges must
sentence a defendant, allows the judge to deduct "points"
from the sentence, i.e., lessen the sentence, if a corporate
defendant, not an individual defendant, took measures to
"detect and prevent" the criminal activity from occurring.
A proper compliance can lower the sentence of a corporation convicted of a crime; it has no relevance to the
sentencing of an individual convicted of a crime.

The list of seven "must haves" from the Sentencing
Guidelines, referred to in EEA compliance plan articles
and presentations are not obligatory (i.e., "The organization must have established compliance standards and
procedures .. .the organization must have taken steps to
communicate effectively its standards and procedures to
all employees and other agents ... "). The document is talking to the judge, not the corporate defendant. The corporate defendant "must have" taken these steps in order for
the judge to fmd that a reasonable plan to "detect and
prevent" crime was in place, not that the company "must
have" done these things as an independent legal obligation.
The Sentencing Guidelines do not actually use the
phrase "compliance plan." This is the tenn which has
developed to refer to the measures to "detect and prevent"
violations oflaw. A company that does not have a compliance plan is not "in violation" of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, and if not convicted pf a particular crime, the

lack of a compliance plan for that aspect of law will be of
no consequence. Conversely, a company convicted of a
federal crime will not be penalized for not having a
compliance plan but will lose its chance of receiving a
lowered sentence. Though not a legal requirement under
the Guidelines, in practice having a compliance plan is the
responsible and indeed the expected way for a company
to conduct its affairs .
There are no "EEA regulations" to comply with. One is
to learn what not to do and not do it. Generally speaking,
compliance plans are geared to aspects of law that are
industry specific and encompass regulations. Banks will
have a compliance plan for Treasury Department regulations, pharmaceutical companies for FDA regulatiOns,
securities dealers for SEC regulations, and telecommunications companies for FCC regulations. As the activities
the EEA criminalizes are substantially the same activities
in which CI professionals should never have been
engaged, an EEA "compliance plan" should not be
substantially different from the existing professional
guidelines a CI firm or profeSSional would be expected to
have or abide by.

Answers to Frequently Aslced Questions
1. Even if the EEA was not intended to deal with
competitive intelligence or general commercial disputes,
hasn't it had an impact nonetheless?
Answer: The impact the EEA has had on the CI
community has been based on anxiety and confusion.
Some companies have mistakenly taken the position that
the EEA has placed them in legal jeopardy because of the ·
activities of their CI professionals.
Ironically, companies who curtail the legal and ethical
activities of their CI professionals have placed themselves
at a competitive disadvantage to companies whose CI
activities continue unimpeded.
2. Don't we have to wait to see how the EEA is applied
in the courts before determining what it prohibits?

Answer: How courts ultimately interpret statutes is a
fundamental part of legal analysis. This does not mean
however that one cannot understand the basic prohibitions of a statute. In fact, a statute can be declared unconstitutional by the courts if it does not provide adequate
notice as to what it prohibits.
The intention and purpose behind the EEA was
clearly explained by Congress prior to its enactment. This
did not include an intention to alter the fundamentals of
corporate conduct, but to deter and punish the criminal
act of trade secret theft.
3. Can't the EEA be applied to situations it was not
intended to cover?
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Answer: It is not unusual for some laws to ultimately
be applied to unforeseen situations. A law once passed
may take on a life of its own. The concern that the EEA will
be applied to routine commercial disputes was discussed
and dismissed by Congress prior to the EEA's passage, with
the Attorney General's letter giving further assurances to
this effect (see page 4) . Companies who remain
concerned are well-advised to study the background of
the law.
4. The defmition of a trade secret under the EEA is
broader than existing trade secret law. What implications
does this have on competitive intelligence?
Answer: The wording of the EEA's defmition enumerates more types of information considered a trade secret
than previous legal defmitions. This is because a criminal
statute should be written in explicit language so as to give
notice as to what it criminalizes, otherwise it risks being
declared unconstitutional. This does not mean that prior
legal defmitions excluded types of infonnation enumerated in the EEA's definition.
In practice, existing legal defmitions and case law
interpretations cover all sorts of fmancial, business, and
scientific information.

Whether the information stolen is included in the
EEA's definition of a trade secret is moot with respect to
professionals whose conduct precludes them from engaging in theft.
S. What effect if any does the EEA have on the legal
risks one may decide to take in seeking information on a
competitor?
Answer: The EEA compounds the legal consequences
for one engaged in theft of a trade secret by adding federal
criminal penalties to an act which already triggers state
civil penalties. This added risk however is of no consequence to one who seeks information on a competitor in
a legal manner.
6. What implication does the EEA have on a
company's efforts to protect information?
Answer: The EEA focuses primarily on the activities it
prohibits. The EEA's definition of a trade secret however,
like state trade secret law preceding it, requires the trade
secret holder to take reasonable measures to keep that
information secret. In practice, the holder of a trade secret
must have taken those reasonable measures in order for
one who misappropriates that information to be held
liable under the EEA or state trade secret law.
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VIA OVERNIGHT COURIER
SCIP Board of Directors
Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals
1700 Diagonal Road
Suite 520

Alexandra, Virginia 22314

Re:

Competitive I11telligellCe IIIUl tIu EcoM1IIie Espionage Act

Dear Board Members:

As you know, I teach trade secrets law at John Marshall Law School and I am an active
See
practitioner and retained expert in trade secret cases around the country.
http://www.execpc.com!- mhallignlr~sumel. html.
At Richard Horowitz's request, I have reviewed his (8117/98) draft entitled "Proposed
Policy Analysis: Competitive Intelligence and the Economic Espionage Act."
This is a well written draft and I endorse it. I strongly agree with the basic underlying
premise -- The EEA does not materially affect competitive intelligence activities and companies
should not curtail competitive intelligence activities based on a "misplaced fear" of the EEA.
In fact, just the opposite is true. Companies should increase competitive intelligence activities
to meet the challenge of an increasingly global competitive environment.

My summary of "Reported Criminal Arrests Under the Economic Espionage Act of
1996" is the most up-to-date information available on EEA prosecutions and convictions. It is
available on the Internet at http://www.execpc.com/-mhallign/indiCl.html. As you can see,
these EEA prosecutions involve trade secret theft and bear no reasonable relationship whatsoever
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seIP Board of Directors

February 11, 1999
Page 2

to legitimate competitive intelligence activities.

If I can be of further assistance to the SCIP Board of Directors, please contact me at
1-312-526-1559.
Very truly yours,

ft.

t{-L ~_

R. Mark Halligan

RMH/js
cc:

Richard Horowitz, Esq.

I...eaer4 .380
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Peter J. Toren
525 University Ave.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
SCIP Board of Directors
Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals
1700 Diagonal Road
Suite 520
Alexandria, VA 22314

Re:

Economic Espionage Act of 1996

Dear Board Members:
I was fonnerly a trial attorney with the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property
Section of the United States Department of Justice where I was involved in drafting the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 ("EEA"), and was the lead prosecutor on one of the
first cases brought under the EEA. In addition, I am a co-author of an article entitled
"Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996," 5 Tex. Int. Prop. L.J. 177 (Winter
1997). Currently, I am a Special Counsel in the San Francisco and Palo Alto offices of
Heller Ehrman White and McAuliffe.
At Richard Horowitz's request, I have reviewed SCIP's "Proposed Policy
Analysis: Competitive Intelligence and the Economic Espionage Act" and offer the
following comments.
The EEA was intended to address both the general need for a federal criminal
deterrent against trade secret theft and the apparent threat of industrial espionage
sponsored by foreign countries. The EEA was not intended to impose new restrictions on
American businesses. I agree with the Policy Analysis that the EEA was not developed in
order to regulate the competitive intelligence community, nor was it developed in
response to any problems that might have existed in the competitive intelligence
community. Competitive intelligence practitioners who abide by SCIP's Code of Ethics
should not be in violation of the EEA. If I can be of further assistance to the SCIP Board
of Directors, please call me at (650) 324-7156 or e-mail meatbmtsdad@AOL.com.

Peter J. Toren
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seIP Board of Directors
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Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals
1700 Diago~ Road
Suite 520
Alexandria, VA 22314
Re:

Economic Espionage Act of 1996

Dear Board Members:
I am a former Chief of the Crimina) Division of the United States
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and co-author of the
chapter entitled "Corporate Sentencing Under the Federal Guidelines," in Obermaier
and Morvillo, White Collar Crime; Business and Re~atory Offenses.
At Richard Horowitz's request, I have reviewed his (1127/99) draft
entitled "Proposed Policy Analysis: Competitive Intelligence and The Economic
Espionage Act," particularly the section dealing with the sentencing guidelines and
compliance plans.
Mr. Horowitz has written an interesting and informative submission,
pOinting out the relationship between compliance plans and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines as they relate to corporations. His analysis is incisive and important.

.

..- ··0 . . .: .. ".

p'-
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'..

.'

MORVILLO, ASRAt040WITZ. GRAND, IASON & SILBERBERG.

seIP Board of Directors

P. C.

-2-

March 2, 1999

I agree with his analysis that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines do not create a legal
obligation for a corporation to create a compliance plan.

If I can be of further assistance to the SeIP Board of Directors, please
feel free to contact me at the above number.

Very truly yours,

~aJo~~ 1MB.
EAles
cc:

EIkan Abramowitz
Richard Horowitz, Esq.
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Appendix F:

Online Resources:
A list of informational internet resources for competitive intelligence, intellectual
property, and general economic and national security
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American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) - www.asisonline.org
Competitive Intelligence Guide by Fuld & Company, Inc. - www.fuld.com
Competitive Intelligence Handbook for business - www.combsinc.comlhandbook.htm
Defense Security Service (DSS) counterintelligence information www.dss.mil/cithreatslindex.htm
Economic and competitive intelligence links - www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/ecintel.html
FBI's National Security Awareness Program (ANSIR) w.ww .fbi. gov Iprogramsl ansirl ansir.htm
Information Security magazine online - www.infosecuritymag.com
Intellectual Property Owners Association - www.ipo.org
Marketing and competitive intelligence resource focused on the United Kingdom www.marketing-intelligence.co.uklaware/sitemap.htm
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) - www.nipc.gov
National Security Institute's Security Resource Net - www.nsi.org
Security Management magazine online - www.securitymanagement.com
Society for Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) - www.scip.org
U.S. Department of Justice computer crime and intellectual property crime sectionwww .cybercrime.gov
U.S. Department of State's Overseas Security Advisory Council- www.ds-osac.org
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